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Abstract 
Information Security covers activity concerned with the protection of data 
to ensure that information remains available, to those with rightful access, 
in the condition that it was originally stored or transmitted. The push to 
interact via electronic data is constantly increasing. Businesses are 
demanding that software designers find novel ways of facilitating 
electronic commerce, creating new business models that have only 
become possible w1tfl 1/Je development of tl7e latemet 
With the increase of traffic in information across the Internet, the risks 
associated with data have multiplied, matching the global growth in 
connectivity. Web application security deals with the measures taken to 
secure software built to promote e-commerce. Because it is necessary to 
accept user input across the Internet these applications carry a particular 
set of vulnerabilities that require a more technical approach to their 
mitigation. The applications themselves are usually composed of modules 
that interact across trust boundaries which all require hardening. 
Information Security governance controls how a company secures its data 
and that of its clients. While there are laws and standards that address the 
security requirement, applying them to all magnitude of businesses is 
difficult because the policies are biased towards large organisations in 
their assumptions of resources. This thesis investigates an international 
compliance and a reasonable level of security. 
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The thesis brings together a method for producing secure web 
applications and a checklist procedure for improving a company's data 
protection practices. Both offerings apply to small software production 
houses where there may be some overlap in role function and the 
pressure to meet software production deadlines can sometimes lead to a 
culture where security is seen as an avoidable expense. 
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1 Introduction 
We are in an information age where quality information has become the 
foundation of success for organisations in any sphere of activity. Advances 
in computer processing power and storage capabilities have increased the 
uses of the technology including streaming of video. audio. instant 
messaging, remote working and buying and selling online (e-commerce). 
Information is now recognised as an organisation's most valuable asset 
and that brings the need for Information Security (lnfoSec) into 
prominence. 
The Internet increased the exposure of all data because it linked networks 
to other networks and made it possible to access data from outside of 
individual networks. The volume of information available has led to the 
success of search engines such as Google whose name has now become 
the generic word_ for researching a topic online. One company in the UK 
(Issue Bits Ltd., 2006) offers a text messaging service that answers 
questions from the public. We now expect information quickly and around 
the clock not only in the form of questions answered but also in goods 
bought, access to information and friends and family contacted. E-cards, 
for example, have increased the accuracy of delivery to match the date of 
an occasion. Online banking has nearly replaced the need to visit the local 
branch and has been encouraged by banks with higher rates of interest on 
accounts set up online. Retailers give online discounts to increase their 
volume of online sales and number of customers because of the efficiency 
of operating via the Internet. 
-Information collection has been made easier by automated processes and 
hence the volume of customer data resident in organisations' systems is 
tremendous. Users are encouraged to register their details in order to 
enjoy the benefits of remote interaction. One example is the Financial 
Times (FT.corn, 2006) a newspaper website which offers readers two 
levels of paid membership with the higher grade giving access to special 
articles and promotions. Both levels require registration of details including 
email address and a password. There would be the choice of saving that 
password to the reader's machine for future automatic login. Those details 
are now stored in two places, the machine and the newspaper's servers. 
On accessing the site those details are transmitted across the Internet. 
The competition for web users' attention has led to the majority of 
websites devising ways of collecting information from visitors to enhance 
and make easy any subsequent marketing interaction. 
The value attached to information has not gone unnoticed by the hackers. 
Digital crime is a constant concern for everyone operating via the Internet 
because the threats to lnfoSec are rising in proportion with the reliance on 
computers to collect, process and store information. A high percentage of 
businesses have installed firewalls on their networks to keep out malicious 
traffic but this is not the final solution as crime conducted over the Internet 
(cyber-crime) has shifted its attention to the vulnerabilities within web 
applications which are allowed through firewalls as authorised traffic. Once 
entry is gained to private networks the threats to the information include 
interception of telecommunications (voice or data), theft I breach of 
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proprietary or confidential information, degradation of network 
performance, blackmail and denial of service (AIC, 2006) . One recent 
threat is that of criminals gaining access to a system, encrypting the 
resident information and offering a price to the data owners for the 
decryption key ( Payton, 2005) . 
The quality of information can be qualified using criteria including 
Confidentiality ,  Integrity , Availability , Authorisation , Authentication and 
Non-repudiation. These would rank differently in importance depending on 
the nature of the organisation. Confidentiality would be of primary concern 
to the military that depends on secrecy for  its success over an enemy. In 
an online shopp ing website, the prices of goods require integrity because 
if tampered with ,  the seller can lose money on a sale . When users attempt 
to access information it should be available as promised because the 
expectation of constant availability has shaped the scheduling  of tasks, 
which before were only possible w ithin the eight-hou r working window. 
International collaboration on projects is an example of this need for 
continual access to data. Information must also be protected by proper 
authentication methods that support the c lassifications used to grant 
access to authorised persons. Non-repudiation ensures that when 
information is sent  there is no chance of denying that it has been received 
as in the case of online contracts where there must be certainty as to who 
has accepted the information. l\letworks remain vulnerable to insider 
attacks or accidental breaches and the proliferation of these has in large 
part been a result of the dichotomy of having to allow access to i nsiders 
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while limiting it to authorised users . The biggest threat to an organisation's 
l nfoSec comes from the staff members but it is not clear how much is 
accidental or malicious . There is also the threat of social engineering , 
where authorised persons are coerced to access the information on the 
criminals' behalf . 
Web a pplications enable e-commerce. They are designed to accept users ' 
information ,  process purchases, inform users of the status of their order, 
deliver software and perform other functions that a re added to enhance 
the customers' experience. Vulnerabilities are present across the entire 
p ipeline and increase with the number of entities involved in completing a 
transaction. Building a secure web app l ication requires software designers 
to identify the flow of information and the boundaries between processes . 
The application should be designed to mitigate these threats and during 
production developers need to test the design at every stage to ensure 
that the design meets the requirements when put into practice. There a lso 
has to be some mechanism whereby the security of an  application can be 
rated with respect to current threats as  these continue to mutate as the 
power of computers and the skills of criminals increase. 
Organisations are subject to leg islation that governs how information 
should be dealt with. There are many laws and sta ndards ,  some of which 
have global significance while others are designed for specific industries . 
In a bibl iography compiled by the Corporate Information Security Working 
Group (C ISWG , 2004) , 8 1  different standards are listed. These standards 
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have increased in tandem with the use of the Internet as a vehicle for 
information exchange.  
To fulfil their obl igation to protect information , organisations need to make 
decisions on the policies, strategies and controls they employ. It is prudent 
that the cost of m itigating the expected damage should not exceed the 
cost-effectively defended therefore o rganisations have to take a decis ion 
as to the level of security an asset can be afforded. 
In the UK the Data P rotection Act (DPA) and the Computer Misuse Act 
(CMA) are two laws that apply to all organisations dealing with dig ital 
information regardless of s ize. The I SO27001 standard (BS I , 2007) is a 
widely accepted gu ide that supports the in tent of the above-mentioned 
laws and provides controls that go further in elevating  an organisation 's 
security level .  .The number of controls l isted in ISO2700 1 and the 
infrastructure assumed by the standard makes it difficult for small business 
to achieve full compliance and certification. 
This thesis p resents two new contributions to lnfoSec by delivering a new 
software development method and a bespoke set of controls derived from 
I SO2700 1 both aimed at small businesses. Small businesses are classed 
as having less than fifty employees . I n  the UK  roughly 99% of enterprises 
are small with 73% being sole p roprietorships (SME Statistics , 2005) .  The 
contributions '  main focuses are companies where staff resources are 
limited and the business case for  staffing a Secu rity Department does not 
value of the information . This makes it apparent that not all risks can be 
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make sense. In these enterprises there is much overlap of roles and in 
order to secure information s uccessfully , Best Practice must be adapted to 
suit the lack of staff and area-specific knowledge .  
The software method is  an amalgam of techniques which involves auditing 
what is already produced and record ing the findings i n  a matrix that allows 
the necessary improvements to be measured . The development team 
adopts a "Secure-by-Design" approach to planning the program. They a lso 
use a su ite of tests to complement a production method called Test Driven 
Development (TD D) (Beck, 2002) which helps produce secure software at 
less expense. 
The 
The ISO27001 
seemingly heavyweight overheads and presents a 
laws and standards developed over the years have shown a bias 
towards medium and large companies where the manpower 
a ll the 
l ist of controls that 
is more likely 
available to be ded icated to fulfil ling the legislated recommendations.  A 
small company wou ld welcome externa l  help in  raising the level of lnfoSec 
in al l its operations. adaptation str ips away 
would provide protection of data to an acceptable level . I t  is also meant to 
raise security awareness within a company so that staff can contribute to 
the constant vigilance needed where lnfoSec is concerned. 
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2 Existi ng Work 
2. 1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the research that has been done in the field of 
information security starting from as early as 1 998 until as late as 2006 . 
The researchers offered solutions ranging from technical innovations to 
improvements in the approach to policy design .  Research into lnfoSec at 
SM Es is also referenced as this top ic is the focus of this thesis. 
2. 2 Application Security 
Web application security is a relatively new field . In 1 998 web applications' 
security mechanisms were described as a collection of clever ad hoe 
efforts to retrofit security (Rubin and Geer , 1 998) .  This paper recognised 
the need for a more serious approach where security is cons idered as part 
of the design stage. 
Since this time the research into web application security has produced 
technolog ical and logical systems to enhance the security offerings of 
developers .  One such proposal was for a three-part framework of systems 
comprised of tools employing: 
• an XML-based language for speci fying credentials and access control 
policies ; 
• secure mechanisms to check the consistency of access control 
information at the global and local levels; 
• authorisation constraints on user assignments to tasks (Thu raisingham 
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et al, 2001 ) .  
Lavery and Boldyreff's project in 2001 looked at the use of web 
applications in a university environment .  This is relevant because 
universities have the dilemma of having systems that require many access 
points for administrators across departments but whose systems must also 
offer access to students w ithin their account privileges. Their proposal for 
a technological solution implementing web-based, user oriented portals 
built around the identity of the user, allowed the security to be dynamically 
maintained. This was also an early example of including security at the 
design stage. 
Web application security continued to score below expectation and 
researchers aimed to assist programmers by providing tools and 
techn iques that allow developers to concentrate on the functionality of an 
application (Scott and Sharp, 2002) .  In another paper published that year, 
the lack of knowledge to create web software of sufficient quality was 
highlighted and the use of traditional software engineering practices was 
suggested (Offu tt ,  2002). 
Further research brought out more issues for development teams to 
consider. The dynamism of the Internet and the variety of components that 
go into a successful cl ient / server interaction pointed to the need for a 
lack of structure, where security critical code is scattered throughout the 
application, made threat mitigation d ifficult (Scott and Sharp , 2003) . 
holistic view of the security to be designed into the system because the 
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....-The approach to security in web applications continued to focus on the 
awareness of the r isks involved and the method of development . Added to 
this was the recognition that business goals determine risks with causal 
links that arrived at the repair and enhancement of web application 
security (Verdon and McGraw, 2004) . This study h ighligh ted the inclusion 
of the bus iness owners i n  the process of determining the scope and 
security measures of web applications . 
I n  2004 Sneed listed some of the difficulties involved in building secure 
applications and h igh lig hted the mercurial nature of web architecture 
stating that "the moment an error is corrected in the server, the interface to 
that server may no longer respond in the same manner . "  The main 
suggestion was that applications should be tested to ensure that they are 
protected from failure in all anticipated situations . The feasibility of th is 
approach can be questioned as it does not cater for unfo reseen problems 
but it is considered as a step in the right  d irection where some form of 
product testing is added to the development process .  
Today web application developers no longer look for  a one-stop 
technological or methodological solution that can be plugged into a project 
to solve all security issues . I t  is accepted that the technology of the 
Internet is constantly changing with updates to present platforms and rival 
technologies arising continuously , creating new security threats that will 
require add itional security upgrades to existing applications . 
Despite the advances made in web application security , in 2001&, Birnieks 
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parameter session Coarse Input Authoridn9 
claimed that some of the same vulnerabil ities still exist. He  pointed out that 
most projects set to go l ive on the Internet are rushed with security viewed 
as a hidden benefit with lower priority against 'interface' development ,  
developers still lacked security awareness and projects were not always 
coded to specification . Recogn ition was also g iven to the fact that today's 
web environments are more complex than before. 
2. 3 Novel Offering 
With this knowledge, the approach in this thesis to improving the security 
offering  of web applications focuses on  making developmen t  teams aware 
of the necess ity of adopting a constantly vigilan t  attitude to the systems 
they bu ild .  The first transformation would be to adopt a "Secure by Design" 
approach which takes a hol istic view of a web transaction and highlig hts 
the various security issues associated with that transaction as shown, for 
example, i n  Figure 1 ,  shown below. 
Providing socure Fine Input 
�onfiguration Va1ida1ionAuthenticating I 
users I IHandling 
I I excepticms I ProtectingI I II son&ltlvo data 
I IDenial of I 
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Figure 1 .  Common web application security concerns (Graf, 2005) 
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and 
transferred 
machines. 
culture of 
2. 4 
The diagram shows the transaction pipeline of a typical web application 
some of the security concerns that are present when data is 
across the Internet and between different applications and 
The second change put in place is the use of a TDD method. The two 
techn iques were chosen in combination to bring to developers a new 
production that should prove more efficient and produce 
applications that are reliable and secure .  The two methodologies are 
described in later chapters. 
Laws and Standards 
Academic studies into the various lnfoSec laws and standards have 
mostly offered explanations of the foundations and ways to improve the 
applicability of these laws and standards to an ever-changing business 
environment .  The studies offer improvements to the scope and util ity of 
the laws and standards that are in use today. They do not specifically 
focus on small UK  businesses but are useful to the theme of th is thesis 
because in them we find common concerns among organisations with 
respect to ln foSec. 
In 2001 Blakley and McDermott said that lnfoSec was in the early stages 
of protecting the information resident on and exchanged among the 
systems of organisations. They speculated that there were similarities 
between the state of l n foSec then and medicine in the 1 9th Century where 
doctors and pharmacologists were at a na'ive stage of u nderstanding the 
1 I 
causes and cures of d iseases . They said 
from research 
a solution similar 
should also be 
to that taken 
within the medical profess ion of certifying doctors and establishing a code 
of practice among them was needed to improve the state of l nfoSec .  
lnfoSec professionals should subscribe to  a code of practice and regularly 
update their subscriptions .  I nformation 
shared more vigorously in  order for ln foSec professionals to remain up to 
date with the latest developments . 
The criminology theories that are at the base of the standards devised for 
l nfoSec have been considered with the i ntention of improving standards .  
Theoharidou's study (2005) suggests that to  develop better standards a 
mult i-paradigm and multi-disciplinary approach towards l nfoSec 
management and insider threat mitigation is needed. This new approach 
should look at recent criminology theories that would enhance the General 
Deterrence Theory (Nag in , 200 1&} that forms the base of ISO1&7799. 
The level of security attached to information needs to comply with a 
common standard when information is shared among business partners. 
The I nternet has made this sharing of data easier than before and has 
also brought new models of col laboration that involve the exchange of 
valuable private data. I nformation systems must also be properly g uarded 
from malicious  use as gateways into other systems. Business partners 
now demand an acceptable level of lnfoSec from one another and would 
depend on standards to play a role in this regard . (von Solms , 1 999) 
Data resident within company systems has to be secure to a level 
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providing accountabil ity for whatever transactions are conducted on that 
data. Controll i ng access to documents with passwords is not considered 
secure enough and biometrics is recommended as the technology best 
suited to provid i ng the correct level of security and accountability. Foote 
and Neudenberger (2005) declare that biometrics is the only way to 
un iquely identify the user and provide proper accou ntability . 
A top-down approach that allows the business needs to d ictate the level of 
security of a piece of information is needed in order to update lnfoSec 
(Gerber et al , 200 1 ) .  A business impact analysis mapped against a 
business related set of questions is used to provide a lookup matrix which 
determines the level of protection 
itself. 
needed for a piece of information. The 
focus in this case is on expanding the remit of security from protecting the 
in frastructure only to include add ing security profiles to the information 
Dh illon and Backhouse (2000) stated that the accepted triad of lnfoSec -
Confidentiality , I ntegrity and Availability - were no longer adequate fo r the 
new ways organisations conduct business and proposed that the quartet 
of. Respons ibi l ity, Integrity , Trust and Ethicality ( RITE) were more in 
tandem with the changes that were taking place in the business world due 
to the high use of Information Technology . Techn ical controls were v ital 
and provided security and accountability but as the form of organisations 
changed with the pace of technology , new ways of addressing the role of 
information in the organisation were needed. For the purposes of this 
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thesis , R ITE wou ld not be used as it adds complex ity while not improving 
its security offering proportionately. 
lnfoSec changes with the way information is used among businesses . 
Information Technology is growing rapid ly and therefore security has 
moved from being a technical issue to being standardised across 
organisations interacting with a number of human / social factors . The next 
step is for l nfoSec to become an integral part of Corporate Governance 
and this is evidenced up by the growing influence lnfoSec professionals 
are having on the boards of major companies because technical solutions 
no longer work alone. This development is seen as  the so-cal led Fourth 
Wave of lnfoSec (von Solms, 2006) that is defined as the process of the 
exp licit i nclusion of l nfoSec as an in tegral part of good Corporate 
Governance ,  and the maturing of the concept of lnfoSec Governance . 
These studies all offer improvements on the present standards through 
various means .  Small and medium enterprises ( less than 250 employees) 
are unlikely to have the resources and sophistication available to larger 
organizations . Consequently, a more modest subset of metrics advocating 
the "Fundamental F ive" (C ISWG, 2004) as minimum essential practices 
appropriate for SMEs is listed as : 
• Malware protection, includ ing worms and viruses 
• Change management , including patch management 
• I dentity and access management, including privi lege assignment and 
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authentication 
required 
• Configuration management 
• Firewalls including workstation , host, sub-network , and perimeter as 
Addition ally , security awareness train i ng prior to being gran ted access to 
the organization 's networks and period ically as condition of continued 
access is recommended. One survey in the UK  showed that only 23% of 
business employees received ongoing training in the security policies of 
compan ies (DTI , 2004 ) .  
Security should be  engineered to  provide a level of protection that i s  
considered 
cost of mitigating vulnerabi&
"good enough" for the purpose (Sandhu, 2003) because the 
lities must not exceed the value of the asset 
being protected. _As it stands at the moment, end users are oblivious to the 
risks their actions  have on systems ( Finch , 2003) and the number of 
instances of lax practices remain a concern ( Furnell , 2004) .  Sandhu's 
recommendation is that security be designed to operate without the 
knowledge of the end user .  
Security is  not a one-stop fix but a continual process evidenced by 
statements such as "efforts should be made to ensure that i t  is  not 
annoying for employees , and users should be rewarded for their good 
behaviour" (Langue, 2005) . 
Smal l  businesses make up the majority of registered businesses and yet 
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their secu rity concerns have not been as extensively researched as big 
businesses . The assumption that big businesses provide all the answers 
needed for security research is erroneous because small companies 
operate with fewer resources and due to an overall lack of technolog ical 
resou rces would often decide to omit security controls where the 
understand ing of the techniques would require a high cost in time and 
labour. Small businesses perform worse than large organisations not only 
in compliance issues but also in areas such as the deployment of firewalls 
and antivirus software For a clearer picture more research needs to be 
aimed at small businesses (Dimopoulos , 2004) .  
2. 5 Summary 
This thesis looks at the difficu lty faced by smal l  businesses in attempting 
to address compliance with the security levels proscribed and presents 
two contribut ions aimed at small businesses that are designed to provide 
security solutions that require a level of knowledge that is more l ikely 
available in the small businesses sector. 
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3 Ensuring Qual ity Software Development 
3. 1 Introduction 
In the early stages of software development, applications were built by 
programmers who followed a simple approach that worked for smal l  
p rojects .  As the size of applications became b igger and their complexity 
grew it became important to structu re the method used for the increasingly 
large teams of developers. 
3.2 Software Development Methods 
3.2..1 Waterfall 
The oldest and best-known method is the Waterfall L ife Cycle (OIT ,  2005) 
that is made up of a succession of stages where the output of one stage is 
the input of the following. Figure 2 shows the stages and how they are 
linked. 
Feas ibi l ity 
Analysis 
Design 
Implement 
Test 
Maintain 
Figure 2. Waterfall Software Development Life Cycle 
A description of the phases follows: 
• Feasibility study: A high-level view of the proposed project where goals 
are dete rmined .  
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• Analysis :  Project goals are translated into defined functions and how the 
application will process data. End-user needs are defined . 
• Design: Describes application operations in deta il, including layouts, 
process diagrams, business rules , pseudo code and all necessary 
documentation .  
• Implement :  Code is written. 
• Test: C reate a testing env ironment to check for errors , bugs and 
vulnerabilit ies. 
• Maintain : Adjusting the application as it is released in  the real world and 
has to cope with different operat ing environments a nd unanticipated 
usage. 
The limitations of the Waterfall model include its a bi lity to cater for 
changing user requirements as the project progresses. Original 
specifications are usually altered when the user is made to be part of the 
development process. The Waterfall method is no longer considered 
useful although many others have been developed based on th is model. In 
a 1 991 Information Center Quarterly article , Larry Runge stated that the 
Waterfall "works very well when we are automating the activities of clerks 
and accountants .  It doesn't work nearly as well , if at all ,  when building 
systems for knowledge workers -- people at help desks, experts trying to 
solve problems, or executives trying to lead their company into the Fortune  
1 00." 
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--developers 
of the 
should 
include the 
oped by Barry Boehm in 1 998 to 
incremental 
are first 
A software development life cycle (SDLC)  should be flexible to include 
new ideas for the performance of the application and 
accommodate methods that reduce the time taken to deliver a working  
product .  Other S D LCs adopted by  software 
following; the Fountain Model, the Build and Fix Model, the Spira l  Model 
and the Rapid Application Development (RAD)  model (O IT ,  2005) .  The 
last two are briefly described below;  
3.2.2 Spiral 
The Spiral Model (OIT ,  2005) was devel&
provide developers with a clearer explanation 
development of a system. The Waterfall model is used to define each step 
to help manage risks .  Details of the highest priority featu res 
defined a nd implemented . Evolutionary progress is made with feedback 
from customers and the system is built up as more detai ls of the entire 
specification a re added to the product .  
The model offers advantages such as  more realistic budgeting due to  the 
early identification of elements , more adaptability to change and an earlier 
start to prog ramming as shown in Figure 3 on the following page. 
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Figure 3.  The Spiral Model (Boehm, 2000) 
3. 2. 3  Rapid Application Development 
James Martin developed RAD in the 1 980s . It does away with the linear 
progression of the Waterfall and allows customers and developers to work 
closely to build thoroughly engineered portions of a system at a very early 
stage of the project. With each version both parties are able to judge the 
effectiveness of the previous specifications ,  correct mistakes and tune the 
performance of the system. Th is process is repeated until the final product 
is del ivered . 
I' 
RAD offers software productio n that is faster and o f  h igher quality by 
defining requirements using focus groups , reiterative user test ing of 
designs ,  re-use of software components and production schedule that 
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waives design improvements until the next product version ,  shown in 
Figure 4 below , 
Developer 
A 
------ -- 2 6 months 
Customer 
Legend 
� - Activity penod for re-designs , re-specify , re-evaluate [1 - 21 days] 
A - Agree on Concept, Scope and Requi rements with customer 
B - Add Changes, programme Features , Funct ions and Specifications 
C - Add Changes ,  fix Defects and tune Performance 
D - Sign off complete application 
Figure 4. Rapid Application Development 
This thesis 
3. 3 Hybrid Method 
accepts the idea that a SDLC cou ld be chosen and adapted to 
best suit the operational demands of the software company. Two 
established methodologies, Secure by Design and TDD .  were 
amalgamated to give developers a schema for the production of secu re 
applications within a cost-effective time frame. 
3. 3..1 Secure by Design 
Secure by Design is a software product ion approach that takes a high 
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level view of the transactions involved across the network when a user 
interacts with a web application. The development team draws up the list 
of assets marking where along the data pipeline they reside creating trust 
boundaries between entities that interact with each other .  By adopting th is 
high level v iew of the entire process , security features can be built into the 
appl ication to counter threats at their locations. It is th is type of threat 
awareness that translates into developers producing applications secured 
with an in depth knowledge of the software capabil ities to mitigate 
localised th reats . 
Securing an application from the design stage is meant to make it more 
protected and fault tolerant . This includes such safeguards as the program 
not breaking when it rece ives an incorrect type of i nput to operate a 
certain function . For example, in some cases a nul l  input can cause a 
poorly built application to throw an exception. 
During the design stage, programmers will look at the application's 
documentation and imagine how a user would interact with the program. 
For example, the web site might need a user to log in with a username 
and a password . Developers will look at the many ways a user can enter 
information and what types of information can be entered. The best way to 
ensure that the application gets the information it needs is to design limits 
on the input boxes that accept only what is needed. This avoids having to 
screen for every type of input that might damage the program but rather 
screen for correct i nput on ly by verifying that input data is in the specified 
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format. In the username i nput box the application would check that the 
input is within a certain length, usually a maximum of 20 characters and is 
of a certain type , agai n ,  usually alphanumeric with no special characters. 
Across the transaction pipeline between user, app lication and database 
there are points of interaction. The user logs into the application, the 
application logs into the database. the appl ication might also get 
information from another web service and the application returns data to 
the user. The guiding principle of Secure by Design is to never trust inputs. 
At each interaction point some form of input is accepted by another object 
within the application or by a web serv ice. It is important that the 
information being passed 1s i n  the correct format and it is what the 
receiving object or web service is expect ing .  By taking a high level v iew of 
these transactions it is possible for programmers to work out the trust 
boundaries and what type of security is needed across each. This 
knowledge informs the design of the application and what security features 
need to be built into the program. 
Another practice that enhances this method is the principle of Least 
Priv i lege where programmers are encouraged to write code while 
operating as a user (Saltzer and Schroeder, 1 97 4 ) .  By doing this . the 
developer gets to experience the program in much the same way as the 
user and avoids building a program that runs smoothly on administrative 
rights but crashes when the level of privilege is lowered to that of the user. 
Across the transaction pipeline the least privilege principle should be 
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adhered to with all users and objects being g iven the level of privilege that 
is needed to do their function and no more. 
The advantages of the Secure by Design method are that the application 
is built with: 
• necessary security measures at each trust boundary it comes across in 
its operation:  
• least p rivileges being g iven to users and objects ; 
: I: 
TDD cuts the g ap between decis ion-making and feedback to a m inimum. 
As the code develops in snippets it is possible to eliminate m istakes at a 
very early stage and avoid the cast of having code errors remain in the 
system long  enough to affect other parts as they are added. 
P rogrammers' skill in  testing is improved with TDD because prog rammers 
acquire the habit of reviewing the effectiveness of the tests they write as 
the construction of the application goes along . The tests are all recorded 
and this accumulat ion makes it easier to test the entire application 
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• the p rogrammer operating in a least privi lege mode to ensure that the 
users' experience is closely mimicked throughout .  
3..3..2 Test Driven Development 
TDD is a code p roduction technique that is the central aspect of the 
Extreme P rogramming method .  P rogrammers break prog rams down into 
all the necessary functions and build their programs one function at a time. 
automatical ly at any stage of its development (Appendix D) .  When new 
features are added to an application the effect that the update has on the 
entire applicat ion can be easily checked as shown in Figure 5 ,  next page .  
Write a test 
Run test 
Fai l 
Write Code 
Run test 
More tests? 
Re-factor Code 
Figure 5. Test Driven Development 
A study of the TDD method (George and Wil l iams , 2003) highlighted some 
of the advantages that have brought this method to the attention of 
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developers. The main findings of that research a re listed below: 
• TDD approach appears to yield code with superior external code q uality 
when compared with code developed with a more traditional waterfall­
like model practice . 
• TDD developers took 1 6% more time than control group developers . 
. . . the control group did not primari ly write any worthwhile automated test 
cases. 
• On  a n  average, 78% of the professional developers believed that the 
approach improves programmers' productivity .  
• TDD approach facil itates s impler design. 
In a study of the retu rn on investment of TDD (Muller and Padberg , 2002) 
it was shown that the conventional development cycle i s  shorter but quality 
assurance is added after the code is written . With TDD quality assurance 
is integral to the development stage and the entire length of that stage 
results in a shorter project t ime. 
3.3.3 Advantages 
The amalgamation of Secure by Design and TDD produces a code 
production method that results i n  applications that protect the information 
they process and are reliably available for online business. Security by its 
nature is always a moving target making the process of guarding 
information a never-ending activity even after the deployment of 
applications. With a sol id design foundation and the abi lity to test the 
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effects of additional safeguards , this hybrid method provides software 
companies with an advantage in offering a high level of l n foSec . 
The tests used in  TDD are i nformed by clear secu rity goals and should be 
written to ensure that new code maintains these goals and safeguards the 
application against anticipated threats . As new threats are encountered , 
new tests are written to ensure the respective countermeasures are i n  
place. Researchers at Microsoft have categorised the security threats to 
software, representing them with the acronym STRIDE (Hernan , 2006) . 
Below are br ief explanat ions of these threats. 
• Spoofing : Impersonating a trusted entity so to induce an i ncorrect action .  
• Tampering : Altering data without the appropriate rights .  
• Repudiation : Denying participation i n  a transaction .  
• Information Disclosure: Exposing data illegally . 
• Denial of Service: Suspending the normal use of a system .  
• Elevat ion o f  P riv i lege :  Gaining higher unauth orised righ ts to data. 
We use the general framework to demonstrate vulnerabilities and 
countermeasures. The vulnerabilities and countermeasures are given i n  
Table 1 and are a superset of  recommendat ions from M icrosoft. research 
at a commercial software enterpr ise and the researcher's own 
experiences. 
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3. 3. 4 Vulnerabilities 
There is a link between these threats and the vulnerabilities that are found 
within software systems . Some vulnerabil ities expose a system to more 
threats than others. Table 1 helps developers design more accurate tests 
because it makes it easier to identify what vulnerabilities to test for and 
what threats to mitigate. 
STR IDE Vulnerabi l ity Countermeasures Threat 
Auditing and Repud iation Secure Log File Management policies 
Logg ing used on the administrative side. 
Authentication Spoofing Special account set up to access the 
Tamperin g  administrative privileges . 
Elevation of Student group leaders have more 
privilege rights than group members . 
SQL authentication between the web 
server and the database. 
Authorization  Spoofing Access the database using stored 
Tampering procedures . 
Repudiation Code access security through the 
Information roles and the privi leges granted. 
disclosure I I  
I ,· Elevation of 
I 
privilege 
j i
1 1  
Configuration Information , Distinct administrative and student 
Management disclosure privileges 
. Elevation of Access is restricted from the student 
p rivilege side. 
The configuration store is kept off the 
Web .  
Cryptog raphy Tampering Strong industry standard 
Information cryptog raphy. 
disclosure Secure hashing algorithm (SHA 1 ) .  
Keys recycled regularly . .. 
Exception Information Structured Exception Hand ling .  
Management disclosu re Error messages g ive limited 
. - - -· · - - · - informat ion - - -- --- - -to the customer. - - -- - -
Input : Denial of : All input is managed with in only one 
val idation · service . page. 
: Web page input validated&. 
: Arguments and the query strings are 
:_ �n_C!)'(:?te�L _ _ __ _ ·-· _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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l 
lt 
dation performed at 
Table 2 lists vulnerabilit ies and the technical countermeasures that can be 
Tampering Sensitive data not passed in 
Information parameters . 
disclosure Sensitive data not passed i n  q uery 
Denial of strings or form fields. 
service 
Spoofing Sess ion lifetime is restricted . 
Parameter 
Manipulation 
Session 
Management Information Session identifiers passed over 
disclosu re encrypted channels with SSL .  
Information Storage of secrets handled with Sensitive 
Data disclosure platform-provided Data P rotection­
API  (DPAP I ) .  
Table 1 .  Vul nerabi l ities ,  STRIDE and Countermeasures 
used by the team. Note that the technology in this case is des igned by 
Microsoft and the majority of solutions come f rom t his software provider 
while others a re the result of the researcher's own expertise. 
Vulnerabi l ity Proposed Tech n ical Countermeasu res 
Input&/ Data I • Buffer Overflows :  Traditional C++, C, Memory 
Validation Overruns, handled by . N ET F ramework , so not an 
issue. 
• Buffer Overflows: Form Level Validation ( Required 
-Field, Minimum Length ,  Maximum Length, Custom 
Rules) . 
• Buffer Overflows & SQL I njection :  Database Leve&
Validation (DB Required, D B  M in Length ,  D B  Max 
Length, SQL Injection , Doub le Encoding). 
• Buffer Overflows :  Business Logic Validat ion , held in 
Business Logic Layer , not Web Layer.  
• C ross-Site Scripting: . N ET F ramework 1 . 1 has bu i&
in C ross Site Scripting P rotection Code. 
• SQL Injection: SQL Injection Vali&
Data Access Level 
• Canonicalization: Microsoft Canonicalization Fix 
Applied. 
Authentication • Login Retry Logic 
• Separate anonymous from authenticated pages (Use 
Built in Web .Config Deny Settings) 
• Encrypt communication channels to secure 
authentication tokens.  
· • Use HTTPS only with forms authentication cookies 
• Use authentication mechanisms that do not require 
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clear text credentials to be passed over the network 
• Do not store credentials. 
• Forms Authentication Still to be implemented . 
• Forms Authentication Routines (Cookie E ncryption ,  
P rotection = All) 
Authorization 1&• Use least privilege accounts. I 1, • SSP I  Database Connections. 
• Configuration 
, Management 
Sensitive Data 
Session  
Management 
'. • Unauthorized access to administration interfaces: No 
administrative i nterfaces in itial ly provided . 
1 • U nauthorized access to configuration stores : 
: 
i Configuration Files are stored on the machine, and 
, are encrypted (See Cryptography) . 
1 • Unauthorized access to configuration stores: Avoid 
storing sensitive information i n  the Web space (XM L 
Form F iles, Configurat ion Files) .  . 
[ • Retrieval of  clear text configuration secrets: 
Credentials are not stored i n  clear text, No use of 
, Local Security Authority (LSA) . 
i • Over-privileged process and service accounts: Use 
least privileged service accounts (ASP . N ET account  
for website, SQL Server SSP I  account for 
: application ) .  
: • Sensitive files not shown in  webspace. 
! • Configure to run under medium trust sti l l  needs to be 
; implemented. 
: • Over-privileged process and service accounts: 
Application should be able to run under Med ium 
i . Trust. 
\ • Lack of individual accountability . 
• No Hard Coded Sensitive Data i n  the Software. 
• Encrypt sens itive data over the network . 
. • Secure the channel .  
• Session H ijacking : Session Timeout Expiration Code 
in place. 
• Session Hijacking: Configure Session Timeouts to a 
mi nimum. 
• Session H ijacking: Ability to configure a maximum 
n umber of website h its within a session .  
• Session Hijacking: Cookie Based , not Query String
based Session Identifier. 
• Sess ion Hijack ing & Man i n  the M iddle Attacks: SSL .  
• Session Hijacking & Session Replay : Abil ity to 
configure an absolute Session Expiry on top of the 
sliding expiration .  
• Session Replay :  Critical Functions (such as On l ine 
Contract sign ing) , require a revalidation of 
Credentials . 
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• Avoid storing sensitive data in session stores. 
• Secure the channel to the session store .  
• Authenticate and authorize access to the session 
store. 
• Enhance Framework's support for Session 
Management , if using Windows Authentication rather 
than the current forms authentication. This is 
because we utilise the Encryption . Verification & 
MAC , built into the . N ET F ramework for forms 
authentication. 
• Forms Authentication still to be implemented . 
• Session Hijacking & Man in the Middle Attacks: 
Forms Authentication Cookies set to P rotection=AII 
(Encrypted , Verified . MAC) .  
Cryptography . • Use Microsoft Enterprise Library Encryption Routines 
where possib le. 
• Encryption of Configuration Files. 
• Encryption of Sensitive Data in the Database (where 
appropriate) . 
• U RL Encryption. 
• Cookie Encryption.  
• Encrypted Communication Channels. 
• Encrypted Viewstate . 
• . N ET Web Application Configuration Files a re 
encrypted using the M icrosoft Enterprise L ibrary 
Configuration / Encryption routines. 
• Avoid key management. Use the Windows Data 
- Protection AP I  (DPAPI )  where appropriate . 
Parameter • Query string manipulation : U RL Encryption. 
Manipulation • Form field manipulation : See Input Validation 
Section . 
• Form Field Manipulation: Viewstate Encryption . 
• Cookie manipulation: Only Authentication Cookies 
are used, which are secured . 
• All Manipulation: Use of SSL .  
• All Manipulation : Avoidance o f  storing sensitive data . 
_ • All Manipulation: Non Reliance of passed data . 
Exception • Revealing sensitive system or application details : 
Management Use of Default Error Page, so where an un-handled 
exception filters th rough,  a custom error page is 
displayed . 
_ • Revealing sensitive system or application details: 
Passwords and sensitive data will not be published 
to the Error Publishing Log. 
: • Use structured exception handl ing (by using try I 
catch blocks) . 
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� 
Auditing & 
Logging 
• Catch and wrap exceptio ns only if the operation adds 
value / information .  
• Failed Logins etc automatically logged 
• Form Level Logging available to Form Builders . 
• Error Publish ing still to be implemen ted. 
• All Security Except ions / U n-hand led Exceptions are 
published to the Error Publishing  Web Service (and if 
it's not available to the Event log) . 
Table 2. Vulnerabi l ities and Technical Countermeasures 
3. 3. 5 Visualising Changes in Threats and Countermeasures 
A development team securing an application wou ld be best aided by a 
system of recording and measuring the steps taken to  fortify the 
application .  When a coun termeasure is added , the team should be made 
aware of the effect th is has on the overa l l  security of the application .  The 
first con tribution of this thesis is a visual metric for the measurement of the 
strength of countermeasures built into an application ,  Figure 6 .  
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Figure 6. Strength of a countermeasure against the severity of vulnerabi l ities 
The Y-axis plots t he severity of the t hreats, calculated by the number of 
STRIDE components that apply to the vulnerabi lity . Authorisation , the 
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process whereby a user is granted rights to data , is affected by five 
elements of the STR IDE acronym and thus ranks as the most vulnerable . 
Sens itive data does not score reflect ively of t h is calculation as t he value of 
the secrets kept in the Data Protect ion Application Program Interface 
(DPAPI) was considered of high value and this raised the severity of the 
threat posed by an attack on the sensitive data held by the system. The 
initial Y-axis values given are not l ikely to be changed throughout the 
development process . 
The X-axis records the effects of the countermeasures designed into the 
application and these values are updated with each additional 
countermeasure. In Figure 6 t he system has lit t le or no cryptographic 
protection of its data. As cryptography is added to the system, the symbol 
would move to t he right to indicate a strengthening of the countermeasure . 
The graph represents a relative summary of the strength of a 
counte rmeasure . I f  the strongest known encryption is applied to the 
system the symbol would be at the far right of the graph but if that 
algorithm is compromised ,  the symbol moves back to the left to indicate 
t here is a margin for improvement . 
The aim of the exercise is to reach the levels of countermeasure strength . 
across all the vulnerabilities , which are considered appropriate by the 
developers. That level must be a decision taken by the company as 
security always involves a cost-benefit analysis . Auditing and Logging is 
an example of a security feature that depends on the deployment 
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env i ronment .  It requires the client to host large files and run additional 
options of the software that can always be decision-based on a return on 
security investment calculation . A software engineer would assess the 
deployment envi ronment of an application ; determine the severity of a 
threat and the effect of st rengthening a particu lar v ulnerabil ity in relation to 
the other countermeasures . The volatility of securi ty requires that these 
measu rements must be regu larly reviewed in order to stay abreast with the 
latest threats . 
A team can illustrate its agreed min imal by a line across the graph 
indicating that symbols to the righ t  of that l ine would represent 
vulnerabil ities that have been sufficiently fortified. F ig u re 7 on the following 
page shows the results of adding countermeasu res to the application and 
how the team rates its security activity. This method for includ ing security 
into the fab ric of applications must be made available to developers to 
make the production of secure applications a co-ordinated operation that 
produces code that is pre-emptive by default. 
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Cryptography ◊ 
Exception management 
Input val idation 
Parameter man ipulation 
Sensit ive data ◊ 
Strength of counte rmeasure in  Session Management 
application � 
Figure 7 .  Strengths of Countermeasures 
The development team decides on the l imits of the countermeasu res built 
into the appl ication by the use of risk analysis to rate the severity of a 
threat . To do a proper analysis developers need to have knowledge of 
hacking techniques to know what are the th reats and how likely they are to 
occur. Risk is proportionately associated with the value of the asset to be 
protected . 
For example Authorisation might score as the most severely th reatened 
vulnerabi lity bu t  the development team m ight possib ly decide that the 
value of the data processed does not carry a g reat risk therefore the 
number of countermeasu res can be fewer than what is needed to provide 
optimum strength . 
The graph presents a v isual, easy to read p rogress report fo r the team to 
share while bu ilding a secure application. It wou ld serve as  an ideal tool 
when the security level of a legacy appl ication is being a udited in order to 
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update the l nfoSec to an 
process of building the necessary countermeasures . 
3. 4 Summary 
appropriate present-day level. 
The following 
The graph is 
useful regardless of method because it records what the team considers to 
be the main vulnerabilit ies and helps measure where the team is in the 
This chapter presented the first contribut ion of this thesis which is a new 
approach to software development supplemented by a measurement  tool 
for developers to gauge the strength of the countermeasures added to 
applications . The development method 
secure applications . 
offered is a hybrid of Secure by 
Design and Test Driven Development which is meant o offer companies 
an efficient method of producing 
chapter highl ights the other contribution of this thesis which offers SMEs a 
tool to improve their lnfoSec management .  
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4 Information Security Governance 
4. 1 Introduction 
Informatio n  systems make use of the Internet and e-commerce by its 
nature involves possible international transactions  and interactions, adding 
complexity in knowing which lnfoSec standard applies to which type of 
business. The standards themselves have not achieved international 
conformance and this presents a challenge to business owners who wish 
to address the issue of compliance with the relevant laws and standards 
within their organisation .  
Adhering to these standards ensures businesses that they are able to  
protect their information, which is often their most valuable asset . Th is 
overhead poses a problem for small businesses (less than fifty staff 
members) where the re is often a multiplicity of roles at t imes resulting in 
the inabil ity to research and enforce such measu res as separation of 
dut ies or job rotation . Research into the recognised standards gives the 
impression that they are aimed at businesses that have developed a 
structure of accountability that can be absent in small businesses. 
4. 2 SME Challenge 
Small companies are likely to be primarily concerned with maintaining the 
g rowth needed to ensu re they achieve their long-term goals. While the 
focus is on maximizing the company's resou rces to meet short and 
medium term objectives . capital also has to be devoted to l nfoSec. For 
example , in the software development industry ,  programs a re produced to 
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process private information gathered by the users of the software. The 
software companies are responsible for the secu rity of the application and 
also have to be mindful of the security levels of their  entire operation. 
4. 2. 1 Laws 
There are laws that are incumbent on businesses to control the handling 
of data and along with the guidance of standards provide a proper starting 
point for the upgrading of a company's lnfoSec status. The langw�ge and 
includ ing moral rights 
The Human R ights Act 1 998 
F reedom of Informat ion Act ( FOIA) 
The  Electronic Communicat ions Act 2000 
The Copyright and Rights in Databases I FAC 
Regulat ions 1 997 
The Defamation Act 1 996 G ICA 
. Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOx) · BASEL 1 1  
Table 3 .  A Sample of Laws and Standards affecting Information 
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volume of the laws and standards ,  some of which are listed in Table 3, can 
prompt many small business owners to abandon the idea of developing 
secu rity policies and providing the supporting procedures. 
LAWS STAN DARDS 
Data P rotection Act 1 998 (DPA) I SO27001 
Computer Misuse Act 1 990 (CMA) COB IT 
D isabil i ty Discrimination Act 1 995 (ODA) GASSP 
The Regulation of  Investigative Powers Act 2000 ITIL 
The Copyright , Designs and Patents Act 1 988 , GM ITS 
H IPPA 
GAISP  
OECD Guidelines 
The standards and laws are sometimes complementary to 
correct handl ing 
affect 
each other and 
sometimes contradictory (Baer and D ietrich, 2006) . Deciding exactly wh ich 
laws and standards to fol low is a challenge for businesses made more 
formidable by the absence of a tool to rate the level of compliance a 
company should achieve with respect to its circumstances. 
The majority of business information systems are based on I nformation 
Technology systems and use the internet to make information available to 
staff and clients and to also enhance functionality of systems that have 
tradition ally operated in closed networks . There are many laws that govern 
the handling of information on IT systems and they can range from the 
DPA,  which helps secure the of data gathered by 
companies to the ODA, which is enacted to secure usabi lity of websites for 
people with physical disabi lities .  
4. 2. 2 Standards 
The number of standards that operations involv ing digital 
information is also high with the most recognised ones being referenced 
by the I nternational Standards Organisation ( I SO) .  This thesis uses the 
latest Information Security Management  Systems ( ISMS) standard, 
I SO2700 1 .  as the basis of a set of controls for UK smal l  businesses to 
assess what l nfoSec activities support legal compliance and a sound level 
of protection . 
BS7799 was developed by the Department of Trade & I ndustry in  1 995 as 
a code of practice to guide U K  businesses in implementing an ISMS .  The 
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standard was basically recommendatory but with its popularity came the 
call fo r a certification process to be added. The standard was split into two 
parts , 6S7799- 1 being the Code of Practice and 6S7799-2 the 
specification for controls needed to attain certification .  
6S7799-2 was updated in 2002 and further in 2005 to become ISO27001 
giving  UK companies a list of controls needed to achieve certification . Until 
the last update companies were free to make omissions of controls that do 
not apply to their situation and needed only to record those omissions .  
Now ISO2700 1 requires organisations to list and explain why omissions 
were made. ISO1 7799-2005 is the Code of P ractice that fo rms the base of 
ISO27001 and is used in this thesis as a n  additional source of 
recommendations that support the controls within the specifications .  
4. 3 SME Compliance 
In the U K  the majority of businesses are small and the number of sole 
p roprietorships has increased from 69% to 73% with in the last four years 
with an estimated turnover in 2005 of £1 90 billion (SBS , 2006). Th is trend 
indicates the importance of providing focus on the security needs of 
companies that do not often have the ability to maintain lnfoSec act ivity at 
the required level . 
These compan ies are involved in industries that handle p rivate informat ion 
in new ways that are made possible through the use of the Internet .  A 
novel example of th is being a farm that sells its p roduce online. This 
involves handling personal financia l data over the Internet and having to 
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take steps to secure that data. 
Companies wishing to operate legally and provide reasonable protection 
for their data need to know which laws and standards pertain to the nature 
of their business . Small businesses could be tempted to view legal and 
standards compliance as something necessary only for large companies 
that are publicly l isted. This is not the case: laws such as the 0PA and 
CMA apply to all businesses that use Information Technology to gather 
and store information . Adopting all or part of I SO27001 would best serve 
; 1 ' ' "1 
any company seeking to improve the security of their data. 
ISO27001 l ists close to 370 items to assist with policy creation and each 
item needs to be considered and documented in  order to achieve full 
compliance .  This can seem an arduous task and examining the entire list 
is time-consuming. For a small business it can mean putting aside 
valuable resources , . time and personnel, to sift th rough the items and 
devise ways of aligning the company's policies and operation to achieve 
an improvement in security standards. The items are described in a clear 
simple language but still requ ire a certain level of ln foSec knowledge to 
help establish a hierarchy among the list that would allow a business 
owner to concentrate on the essential steps 
The threats to the data owned by a business can come from either offline 
or online sources affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(Pfleeger, 2002). The confidentiality affects the level of disclosure of 
i nformation such as trade secrets and customers' private data stored on 
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the business' computers . Integrity of the data is important because it 
affects all aspects of commercial act ivity from order ing from suppliers to 
receiving payments from customers . Al l  businesses face the threat of not 
having their data available to conduct business .  Each business has a 
Maximum Tolerable Downtime (Harris , 2005) during which it must get its 
operation going again before it becomes impossible to restart the business 
after an interruption of service. 
The need to comply with information security laws and standards can at 
times be viewed as an additional overhead which hopefully can be 
avoided due to the rationale that a security breach has never been 
experienced by the company . Th is v iew is erroneous and can lead to a 
false sense of secu rity . It can also leave the company legally liable in the 
event of a security breach that exposes its clients' private information . 
Legal and regulatory pressures also increase as companies expand 
creating a need for clear ,  concise, internal governance. This adjustment 
can bring real benefits in terms of efficiency as well as a means of 
reducing information risk (DTI , 2005) . A clear information security policy 
can: 
• reduce ambiguity 
• provide clear management direction and commitment 
• establish agreed roles and responsibilities 
A well thought out security policy can provide a means of dealing with the 
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unavoidable d ifficulties of managing information such as balancing the 
need to share information with the need to restrict access to it . 
Security is a cost-benefit decision. Owners of assets would gauge the cost 
of the item and the level of security needed, aiming to minimize secu rity 
costs but maximize security benefits (Butler, 2002) .  A risk analysis assists 
a company in the decision of where to spend its security budget . F rom the 
calculations performed on different eventualities ,  a company can see 
where it stands to lose most, which are its greatest threats and what cost 
effective measu res it can take to mitigate such threats. 
Risk analysis is  a technique used to calcu late the l ikel ihood of a damage­
causing event .  Damage is considered any harm to a prized asset and in 
the scope of this thesis that asset is business information . As an exercise 
it is important to focus on accurate calculations more than the aim to 
achieve p recise measurements of such quantitative items as the cost of 
being attacked . It must be remembered the numbers arrived at would be 
subjective and apply to the particular company as no two companies 
would assign the same value to a certain asset. 
The cost of damage is usually quantified with more certainty than the 
chance of the event occurring and these two assigned values are used in 
an equation that covers the t ime span of a calendar  yea r .  The basic 
calculation is : 
cost of incident x annual probabWty = Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) 
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For example, an attack on the business' network that takes it off the 
Internet can cost a company £50 000 and the chances of it happening 
within a calendar year can be 40 percent. The ALE associated with that 
risk would be £50 000 x 0 .4  = £20 000 . 
The measures to mitigate that loss can be used in another  calculation 
called the Modified Annual Loss Expectancy (modALE) .  The measures 
reduce the probability and this affects the final outcome. A further example 
would be if a staff security awareness program reduces the risk of the 
attack by 1 0  percent then the new probability is ; 
annual probability x (1 - mitigation)&
; 
= 0. 4 x 0. 9 = 0.&36. 
The modALE is then £50 000 x 0.36 = £ 1 8 000 . The savings made in the 
case of staff education would be&
ALE - modALE, £20 000 - £18  000 = £2 000. 
The cost of the education prog ram can then be justified as a positive 
return on investment if it is anything less than the £2 000 (Berinato , 2002) . 
4.4 Adapting /SO27001 
For small b usinesses without the technical and legal knowledge, 
compliance can be expensive because of the time it takes to do a risk 
analysis, research the applicable laws and sou rce useful guidance. 
ISO27001 offers advice towards a cert ifiable level of security that in many 
cases would be considered overkill for the size of the company. A smart 
approach would be to use the parts of the standa rd that would improve the 
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security of the organisation in a cost effective manner. 
The ratings of the controls of ISO27001 in this thesis are originally based 
on five criteria. The first two are the laws that apply to UK fi rms ;  the third 
and forth being items considered necessary but with decreasing degrees 
of applicability i n  a small bus iness environment .  The last group being the 
controls where the cost of i nvestigation may prove too h igh  for the security 
retu rns .  There is a certain amount of subjectivity based on the 
researchers' knowledge of information security and experience of the 
operations  of small bus inesses but this is supported by the use of a r isk­
benefit analys is that considers the likelihood of an event against the cost  
of  mitigating that threat . 
The rat ings  are used to assist in the prioritisation of actions  needed to 
achieve legal compliance and a level of acceptable security for their 
systems . The controls ranked DPA and CMA as the first priorities as they 
are both legally binding .  Acting on these would also provide a business 
with the primary steps for provid ing a safe legal environment for the 
company's system and data. A brief introduction to the two laws follows : 
The Computer Misuse Act of 1 990 (CMA, 1 990) defines offences that 
cover a broad range of activities that are carried out by those having 
mischievous intent . 
The Act identifies three specific offences: 
• U nauthorised access to computer material . 
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• U nauthorised access to a computer system with intent to commit or  
facilitate the commission of  a serious crime. 
• Unauthorised modification of compu ter material . 
The Data Protection Act of 1 998 (DPA 1 998) sets out rules fo r  processing  
personal informat ion on paper as well as on  computer. The Act imposes 
obligations  o n  those who record and use personal informat ion to be clear 
about how information is used and gives certain rights to individuals. The 
Act follows eight data protection p rinciples
Data must be&
: 
: 
• processed fai rly and lawfully 
• obtained for specified and lawful purposes 
• adequate, relevant and not excessive 
• accurate and , where necessary, kept up-to-date 
. . I 
• not kept for  longer than necessary 
• processed in accordance with the subject's rights 
• kept secure 
• not transferred abroad without adequate protection 
Abid ing by laws is never enough to curb criminal intent. That then poin ts to 
a need for social and technical constrain ts that anticipate mal icious 
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conduct The 'H igh' and 'Medium' priority controls provide cost effective 
security against the threats present both within and outside of a company.  
There may be some overlap with the legally required items but the main 
criteria for the high rating was the level of risk reduction achieved when 
the controls were put in place . This is important  because other than the 
CMA and D PA items, the remaining controls from the ISO2700 1 standard 
would be over 300. 
The CMA and D PA rankings cover the legislative obligations of a company 
across all areas of l n foSec. The 'H igh' ranked controls are those 
considered critical and universal to any business operating a network 
whether private or via the Internet. The implementation of these controls is 
expected to have a positive security investment return. 
The 'Medium' controls a re those considered less appl icable to sma l l  
businesses but usef.ul i n  situations where they apply with a probably lower 
return on secu rity investment .  
The 'Low' ranked controls are the ones least likely to be applied to a small 
business and when implemented the return on security investment is not 
expected to reg ister an automatic benefi t .  An example of the rat ing of the 
controls in  Controlling Access to I nformation and Systems section is g iven 
in Table 4, on the following page. 
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Rank Specifications 
Securing Against Unauthorized Physical Access, Managing 
CMA User Access, Securing Unattended Workstations, Types of 
Access Granted to Third Parties 
DPA Granting Access to Customers 
Controlling Access to Operating System Software, Managing 
High Network Access Controls, Managing Passwords, Managing 
Access Control Standards 
Controlling Remote User Access, G iving Access to Files and 
Documents, Managing Higher Risk System Access , 
Acceptable Usage of Information Assets, Access Control Med Framework , Monitoring System Access and Use, Node 
authentication ,  Monitoring Third Party Services, Controlled 
pathway , Management Duties, Third Party Service Changes 
Access Policy , Diagnostic and Configuration Port Controls, 
Third Party Service Management , Why access is granted to 
third parties 
Table 4. Rating controls in Control l ing Access to I nformation and Systems 
Low 
The controls are presented to business as a q uestionnaire about an 
organisation's level of compliance with each specificat ion . I SO27001 is 
kept in its original structure with the 'Low' ranked controls deleted in order 
to provide a sharper focus with positive security investment returns for 
small businesses seeking to improve the security of the company's 
information. 
4. 5 Info Sec Questionnaire 
The remaining controls' rank labels are removed and the result is a list of 
controls that would ensure a business is legally compliant and can achieve 
a high cost-effective level of lnfoSec. To create a q uestionnaire , the 
majority of the controls are developed into questions that require a Yes / 
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No answer. Th is was not a lways poss ib le as i n  the case of q ue ry i ng  staff 
awareness of a Secu rity Po l icy in wh ich case a choice of 'SOM E ' ,  'ALL' o r  
' NONE '  was  g ive n .  
The questio n na i re i s  des ig ned to make i t  poss ib le i n  the futu re to add 
scor ing featu res based on  the nu mber of pos itive answers submitted . At 
the t ime of Thes is submiss ion the questio nna i re is u sefu l as  a n  l nfoSec 
aud it too l  that uses the I SO2700 1 standa rd as a base for its i nvestigat ion 
and supp l ies bus i nesses with the rat iona l isat ion and imp lementat ion log ic 
for each contro l .  
4. 6 Summary 
The laws and  sta ndards  that app ly to U K  compa n ies we re l isted a long with 
the h istory of ISO2700 1 wh ich l i sts 367 contro ls fo r bus i nesses to account 
for if they wish to ga i n  comp l i ance with th is standa rd .  The standa rd is 
ad apted for SMEs  by_ rati ng the controls from those that a re compu lsory to 
LOW wh ich a re cons idered to p rod uce a negative return on  i nvestment .  A 
questio nna i re is prod uced from the compu lsory ,  H ig h  and  Med rated 
controls and  is p resented in the fo l lowi ng chapter. 
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5 Information Security Check List 
1 .  INFORMATION SECURITY ORGAN IZATION 
Information Security Policy 
IQuestion : I Is  there an  information security pol icy? 
Options: I YES I I N O I I L I M ITED I 
Information Security must be management led before filtering down 
through the organisation to involve everyone. This ensures that the security 
plans are closely tied to the strategic decis ions of the company and that the 
resources needed to provide an adequate level of security are made 
available. Managerial involvement also guides policy towards provid ing a 
better business case for proposed controls . 
Without managerial i nvolvement and support a security policy risks 
becoming a useless document that does not mirror the business ' 
processes and lacks the financial support needed to implement the 
necessary controls . I n  large companies personnel in charge of security 
have been promoted to board level in order to provide support to an activity
that has become vital because of the risks associated with digitisation of 
data. 
A security policy is an established set of rules for safeguard ing information 
from accidental or malicious damage. It establishes responsibil ity and 
accountability for Information Security ( lnfoSec) and raises security 
awareness throughout the organisation . It provides a framework for best 
practice throughout the organisation and ensures that a company remains 
legally compliant. 
The objective of an lnfoSec policy is to communicate the risks posed to 
information a nd the preventive measures taken. The security policy should 
be brief and in a language easily understood by employees with statutes 
that are easy to follow. An lnfoSec policy can be developed along the 
following suggested out l ine. 
Subject: Highlights the lnfoSec risks addressed by the policy. The policy 
should reflect the operation of the business in order to convince readers of 
its j ustification . 
Scope : Specifies the areas of concern that the policy will address. Records 
the departments , individuals and technical systems referred to in the policy. 
Description :  Gives the background , describe the risks that have been 
identified , state the security expectations that the policy wi l l  fulfil. 
Procedures a nd Gu idel ines :  Mandatory practices : This is the minimum 
standard which has to be implemented . Procedure for implementation: A 
step-by-step procedure that wi ll be followed for implementation of the 
policy. References will be made to forms , templates , standards ,  guidel ines 
etc. that could be found in the attachments. 
, 
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Roles and Responsibi l i ties : Duties of different staff roles as related to 
lnfoSec. 
Defin it ions: The meaning of terms used throughout the policy . 
Enforcement: How the compliance will be monitored . How non-compliance 
will be reported and what actions would be taken . D isciplinary actions. 
agreed to by HR  / Management, to be taken if the policy is not adhered to 
including names of the persons appointed to enforce these policies. 
Poi nt of Contact: Person or office a staff member can contact with policy 
queries. 
Attachments :  Forms, Templates Standards ,  Technical guidelines I 
Authority :  List the essential policies, legislation and company directives 
under various and applicable controls. Authors of  the policy should be 
listed . 
Location : Where all staff can access the pol icy. 
Effective Date :  Start date of policy. 
Revision H istory:  Changes made to pol icy on last revision 
Review Schedule :  Timetable for  policy review. 
' , ,
The nature of the threats to information changes along with the growth of 
the business and the advancement of technology. A security policy should 
be reviewed at least annually . 
The review would address questions of change to the business' operation 
and the technology used to support it. Have new products been added <1 
since the last policy review? Are the new processes covered by the lnfoSec , I  
I ,  
policy? Have new-staff roles been introduced to the business? Has new 
technology been introduced to the business? Are the new threats covered i i  i i
by the policy? 
The time needed to conduct a review of the lnfoSec pol icy would depend 
on the size of the company, its operations and the complexity of the 
technology used in  the business. Regular recording of the changes to 
operation, staff and technology throughout the year would help prov ide 
ready documentation of the factors that affect its relevance. 
Attached in Appendix C is an example of an ln foSec Pol icy 
Information Security Organization 
Question: I Are staff aware of th is policy? 
Options: I SOME I I ALL I I N ONE i 
Staff should sign up to the security policy offered by the company. The 
policy may include or be sepa rate from such items as a don-disclosure 
agreement and an accepted usage policy . This can be a condition of  
employment stating that reading and accepting the conditions of the 
security policy is a necessary part of the contract. 
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The company sets the respect the staff would have for the value of its 
information by insisting that staff members be awa re of its security policy . If 
this is followed up with regular security awareness training and effective 
updating of the policy . a company is better posit ioned to protect its data 
through the cooperation of its staff. 
The lnfoSec pol icy should be readily available to staff either as a printed 
document or on the local intranet . Staff should have the abi l ity to access 
guidance on issues as they arise without always having to confer with 
mam�gement .  
I f  this policy is made readily available staff can easily refer to it in times of 
doubt and when their judgement is challenged in situations such as 
working remotely , travelling with company information, disposing of data , 
social engineering attacks and adhering to a clear desk policy . 
Social engineering attacks are a good example of such situations because 
the attacker is attempting to coerce a staff member into giving vital 
information either through the use of confidence tricks that can take many 
forms. The term was popula rised by Kevin Mitnick, a reformed computer 
hacker and security consultant who points out that it is easier to get 
information from humans than spend the effort hack ing networks . 
There should be deterrents for violating the security policy and staff should 
be aware of possible consequences. Ind ication of these penalties should 
be written in the security policy of the company. The penalties should also 
. give staff the impression that the company takes security seriously and 
. would not tolerate activities that put the business at risk .  
Question: Is i nformation securi ty a regular i tem on the agenda of i' , .managerta l meetings? I i
1 i iOptions: Y ES I I NO I I LIMITED I 
Management should include security of information as a regula r  item at 
meetings because Information Security not only  protects the information 
systems but also the Intellectua l  property of the business and thus is a 
value protection exercise .  
When management actively di rects and supports lnfoSec . i t  moves from 
being a technical to a business pursuit. This makes it easy for the company 
to quantify the return on security investment . Changes made to the 
business processes are likely to be quickly covered by security measures 
because the two processes a re no longer separate. 
2. CLASSIFYING I NFORMATION AND DATA 
Setting C/assif1cation Standards 
Question : Is i nformation c lassified? 
0 tions :  Y ES N O  
Classi in information hel s with decisions as to how much resources 
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I should be put towards securing a piece of information. It breaks down the 
information into smaller definitions leading to the appropriate budget per 
classification . The number of classifications should be kept to a minimum.  
Question : I ls  there a guide l ine for classifying i nformation? 
_Qptions: I YES I I I NO I I 
Information can be classed in many ways . For the business owner it is 
important to know what information is crucial to the life of the company , 
what is important for its daily operation and what information can be 
exposed to the public. A higher security level should be accepted as 
default. A guide is also good for staff who will be deali ng with information 
far removed from management but which will need to be protected to an 
appropriate level all the same. 
With a simplified categorisation of data it is easier to create guidelines for 
labelling data because all staff wou ld then be able to link the function that a 
piece of data performs to its role in the business . This guide should be 
made readily available to all staff perhaps via the company's network, 
I ntranet ,  a poster or any other form that is regularly visible . 
Each classification wou ld requ ire a different approach to i ts storage and 
handling. Such a policy acts as a guide for all staff. 
Information can be classified as follows; 
• What is crucial to the life of the business e.g. strategic plans, all user 
IDs and passwords used and customers' private data. 
• What needs to remain internal to the business e.g.  policies and 
procedures for employees . 
• What can be made public e .g. news that the company wishes to make 
available outside of the company.  
A consistent method for labelling information would help the company 
handle and store data more efficiently .  Within Microsoft Word for example 
i there are features within  the File&/ Properties section for securing a 
\ document. 
Question: Is someone appointed as the owner of classified 
i nformation? 
Options : YES I I NO I I I 
The owner would decide the level of security and the rights attached to the 
information . The owner is also accountable for the information 's security . 
All information owners need to be identified and assigned this 
responsibility 
. It is to the owner other users would apply for permissions to the data. This 
system adds accountability , as the owner knows who has access to what 
and what rights are assigned. Without an owner it is possible for users to 
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gain access to privi leged data and not have this recorded. 
The presence of someone who handles the d istribut ion of data priv i leges 
protects staff from making decis ions that may not be i n  l ine with company 
policy when they receive access requests from other users . For example , a 
new staff member might  ask for access to an application from someone in 
the company .  If that person decides to " lend" them their ID and password, 
the new member would have gained all the pr ivileges of an established 
staff member and this m ight not be official ly recorded . 
Question: I Is confidentia l i nformation kept separately? 
Options : I YES I I N O  I I I 
Top-secret information requ ires the highest protection as this can mean the 
difference between success and failure of a business . Business strategic 
plans, staff p rivate data , staff passwords and financial records are 
examples of top-secret data. 
As personal valuables are sometimes kept in safe boxes in a bank ,  
businesses should consider vaulting their most valuable information safely 
and remotely . The remote storage is used to as a back up in the event of 
some disaster at the company's location. 
3. CONTROLLING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS 
Controlling Access to Information and Systems 
Question :  I ls there an overa l l  access pol icy? 
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Access policies describe who gets access to what. A policy based on the 
classification of data and rules of those who own the data would help staff 
decide how access rights are granted to data objects . A well-designed 
access policy prevents the corruption of access rights. 
In small companies the owners are usually involved with a ll the business 
processes and serve also as the person giv ing access to anyone who joins  
the company . A joiner can be on  a permanent or project basis and the 
company would have to decide how much of the company's data should be 
exposed. 
An access policy would provide a thought out , d isciplined approach to the 
process of granting access to data. If for example an accou ntant  visits the 
company's office monthly to update the accounts, it might be prudent to 
limit access to the financial data and perhaps applications also . 
Whi le this approach might seem extravagant, the accidental or malicious 
damage to company information must not be overlooked . An accountant 
with access to a company's software development application can wreak 
damage that can prove to be very expensive. 
i .  
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Question: I ls access to information controlled? 
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Each p iece of information should be classified and be appropriately 
secured . The data owner would assign rights to the information based on 
an agreed policy. With proper accountability in place, the control of 
information can be monitored. 
Information is a highly valuable asset of a company and some of it must 
necessarily be kept secret. The keys to cabinets, drawers must be the 
responsibi l ity of someone in the business and not p laced in areas of public 
access. Passwords to company information should be treated as top secret 
and changed if ever a breach is suspected . 
Encryption protects data by making it unreadable to anyone without the 
correct keys . Many operating systems come with an encryption facility and 
are quite simple to use. The level of encryption can be chosen and the 
distribution of keys is done automatica lly . 
0 tions : YES NO 
Many businesses conduct their main business processes through an 
appl ication .  It is important to secure access to that application to those in 
the company that are responsible. 
For example , Customer Relationship Management (CRM)  packages where 
vital customer data is processed should only be accessed by staff that are 
trusted to handle this information . An application such as this would contain 
all the company's v ital customer information including contacts and 
histories . Exposure of this information into the wrong hands can lead to 
serious competitive disadvantage to the company. If the information is lost , 
damaged or made inaccessible the company can suffer a tremendous 
setback .  
Question: Is access to fi les and documents contro l led? 
Options : YES I I NO I I I 
Each file should be classif ied and data owners should assign access rights 
to that file . Secure areas should be established on the network to 
correspond to data classification. 
Files and documents can be password protected. Documents can be 
produced in the Adobe PDF format to protect them from being altered. 
Microsoft Word has the facility to lock documents also . Folders can be 
password protected to safeguard a selection of files . 
Question: Are users forma l l  re istered before access is erm itted? 
0 tions : YES NO 
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This extends to persons outside of the company. A registration process 
would record such information as the role of the person or their level of 
membership. 
When the company begins a relationship with an individual&/ system in 
whatever capacity be it staff, consultant ,  supplier or c l ient there should be 
some record of this and a decision as to what level of the company's 
information wou ld be granted. 
A register would a lso be useful when the access levels of an individual&/ 
system has to be altered or deleted. Systems can be any other application 
or computer that interacts with the company's information. 
Assess rights can easily be overlooked at a time of change and i t  is 
possible for there to be 'access creep' without a pruning of privileges which 
are no longer needed. 
1 Question: Is there documentation of access requests and 
a uthorisations? 
Options :  YES I I NO I I I 
There should be a record of who has access to what within the company. 
When new rights are to be assigned a record of the request should be kept. 
With such records it is easier to review a person's access right when roles 
change or employment terminates. 
A spreadsheet can be used to record a name against the access rights
held by that person or system and when those privi leges were assigned. 
Question :  I ls there is periodic review of access rights?  i i  , ,
Options: I YES · 1 I NO I I I 
It is very important to review and update the access rights as the business 
changes and roles in the company change and staff members assume 
different responsibilit ies. 
A proper record of the assignment of access rights would make this a 
simpler exercise because all the information would be in  one location. A 
periodic review should be scheduled which is in tandem with the growth of 
the business .  I t  can be expected that the reviews be conducted quarterly. 
Corruption of staff is also a possibility that should be guarded against with 
regular questioning of the appropriateness of the rights given to an 
individual .  
Question: Is there a formal  recess for a l locatin asswords? 
0 tions: YES NO  
Passwords to company files ,  documents, applications and equipment 
should be allocated to only to required staff and this process should be 
recorded . This would corn lement tracki n  of access ri hts iven to an 
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Options: I I YES NO I I I 
' 
' 
employee throughout his time with the company. 
It is not always possible to create a user l ist for an application or document 
where each user can create their password. The default passwords should 
be kept as safe as possible and if recorded in a document , that document 
should be given the highest level of protection .  which might include 
encryption. 
Passwords should be easy to remember but d ifficult to guess.  A mixture of 
letters and numbers with upper and lower cases would normally provide a 
password that is unique. I n itialising of personal phrases would provide a 
memorable password . E .g.  " I  want to make a secure password" can 
become "iwtmasp" which can be changed to " 1 wtmaSP" . 
Staff should be given these guidelines if they have to form their own 
passwords . Remember passwords are private and once under the control 
of staff there is not much the business owner can do to ensure that 
passwords are of a high quality . 
That is not ent irely true as 'regex' scripts can be used on appl ications  to 
ensure the presence of certain characters in  a password when it is first 
constructed. This is not always available so the education of staff of the 
need to have a strong password and how to devise one is a sound 
investment towards the protection of company information .  
Default passwords tend to be quite standard , e .g .  pword , and can easily  
become widely known throughout a company . They should be changed on 
initialisation . A reminder should be shown to users about the importance of 
using strong unique passwords . This is usual handled automatically by 
applications that are designed to force users to change the defa ult 
password on the first use. If th is is not automated the data owner can make 
manual checks with the default password to ensure that it has been 
changed 
Question: Il Are there controls on access to the operating system? 
The operating system is the basis of the company's information technology 
and should be protected from any damage. Passwords on the servers and 
local machines keep out unauthorised users. 
F i rewalls a lso help i n  prevent ing malicious traffic coming in from the 
internet that may deliver viruses that cause harm to the operating system. 
While firewal ls continue to provide protection, hackers have moved their 
focus to using web app l ications as the method of del ivery and this can be 
countered by l imiting the internet traffic on the company's network , bu ild ing 
secure web applications if the company's business is to interact with the 
public on l ine and regularly updating anti-virus and anti-spyware. 
Question : Is there a restriction on users sharin  10s? 
0 tions: YES NO 
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Shared I Ds carry the danger of granting authorisation to the wrong person. 
They also are an indication of low security awareness likely leading to 
shared default passwords that remain unchanged . 
Shared I Ds can also g ive a staff member access to parts of the network 
that he would not usually have .  Sometimes someone with an ID  might have 
access added to his role as time goes by due to the number of p rojects and 
responsibi l ities he might take on. To share this person's ID with anyone 
else would grant that other person all the accumulated rights of the o riginal
I D  owner. 
A safer practice is to design roles within the company and assign a basic 
level of access for each role so when someone joins the company he can 
be assigned a 'starter's' role ID which would be expected to be altered in 
t ime as that person's responsibilities grow. 
Question: I l s  there a pol icy controll i na i nformation usaae? 
Options: I YES I I NO I I I 
I nformation should be used for a specified purpose and should not be 
misused otherwise. E .g .  the Data P rotection Act does not allow customers 
data to be used as test data for newly developed systems. A policy stating 
what safeguards a re needed for each classification of data would help staff 
properly handle data and avoid such mishaps as placing restricted 
information in confidential or lower level documents . 
An example of the above is the p roduction of manuals for the company's 
systems that include screen shots containing information that should not be 
exposed in a document that has a low-level security rating. A manual can 
get into the hands of .someone wishing to use the revea led information 
maliciously . 
Question : Is system access and use monitored? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Monitoring helps measure the effectiveness of secu rity policies and also 
collects evidence in the event of a breach. With a monitoring system in 
place a company can also impose rules such as lock ing o ut a u ser after a 
certain number of failed attempts to log in . Repeated failed attempts can 
signal a brute force attack on the system and locking out  a user stops the 
approach . A legitimate user can always get in touch with the system owner 
and reset the password. 
Traffic across the network can be monitored to get an idea of usage 
patterns among staff. Network intruders would tend to leave unusual 
patterns with can be recorded to help strengthen points of entry within the 
company's system. 
Question: Is th i rd access to i nformation control led? 
0 tions: YES NO 
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Contractors, business partners and outsourcing companies would need to 
have access to information. This access should be recorded and tightly 
controlled. Access should be restricted to information that is needed only. 
Third party access should be viewed as temporary and revoked at the end 
of each p roject / interaction . 
4. PROCESSING I NFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS 
Networks 
i Question :  I s  someone i n  char  e of  network securit ? 
I O tions: YES N O  
This is a n  important security function and should be assigned to a role that 
p rovides accountability. I n  a small company such a role would be most 
l ikely hand led by the business owner. 
The responsibility for the security of the company's information should be 
recogn ised as being i n  the hands of one person . This adds control to 
p rocess of assigning access to the company's information. 
The person in charge of network security should be able to adjust software 
settings on the PCs and servers in the business i n  order  to create a secure 
! operating envi ronment. 
I Question :  Are the ski l ls needed to defend the network present in  the I 
corn any?i -4----------------------
0 pt ions: YES I I NO I I I 
A skilled network manager makes a difference in the level of security of a 
system. Proper implementation of security guidelines req uires someone 
who is skilled in this field . 
. The skill to secure a network and the computers withi n it might not be 
! available within the company. A company can source an expert who would 
1 set up a secure network and provide regular support service . 
Question :  Is the  network rotected from remote attacks? 
· 0 tions : YES NO 
Firewalls, I ntrusion Detection Systems and I ntrusion Prevention System 
i are three technologies to help secure a network. User log-on , logging of 
t raffic and regular u pdating of security patches would add to the level of a 1 
; network's security. 
/ There should be strict controls on the access to the network from remote 
i locat ions .  Extra checks shou ld be carried out to verify a u sers' identity and 
: access to sections of the network should be limited . 
Small businesses can use a manual login p rocess whereby someone can 
I phone in a request to log onto the network and that can be done by the 
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person in the office. This approach is effective but limited in application as 
it requ ires someone to be in the office at the time the other person requires 
remote access . Creating a remote access account and giving the 
credentials to the user wh i le in the privacy of the office is an effective 
strategy . The user must memorise the information to avoid having it found 
by anyone else. 
Question: I ls the network protected from i nternal attacks ?  
Options : I Y E S  I I NO I I I 
Access to computers in the network should be password control led. The 
cabling should be protected from physical damage and the server 
equipment shou ld be kept i n  a secu red room. Logs should be kept of all 
activity on  the network .  
I f  networks are shared across an organisation there should be  some form 
of standardisation that ensures that one part of the network is as secure as 
the other . When a new system is added to the network the overall security 
level becomes that of the weakest point. 
The security of a system should be gauged before adding it to a network 
and the resu lting strength of a merger should be evaluated before the 
entire network goes live. 
Question : Are security patches appl ied immediately to network 
components? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Security patches  m ust be applied as soon as they are sent from vendors. 
Patches fix vulnerabilities and without them a system is susceptible to new 
attacks on the weak points within the network . 
Patches protect systems from the lower skilled hackers who are not on the 
cutting edge of software exploiting and are usually the practitioners of 
second hand knowledge by which time the vendors might have produced a 
patch to neut ralise any attack on the previous vulnerability. The sooner a 
system is patched the less time a hacker has to exploit a known 
vulnerabil ity . 
System Operations and Administration 
Question: I Are there controls on how data is  distributed? 
O ptions: I YES I I NO I I I 
Data copies should be limited to on ly what is necessary and should be 
tracked. Data c lassification should always be applied to company 
information to make it easier for staff to understand the necessity of the 
controls p laced on indiv idual pieces of data. 
Data can be distributed by a n umber of means, each with their own 
hazards. Printed data is usually unencrypted and can be misplaced by its 
owner. Digital data carries the risk of having malicious alterations go 
60 
, ,, ,  
' I  
undetected . It i s  also eas ier to copy and distribute to a wide audience. 
Laptops carry the infamous reputation of being lost  with important company 
information. Encrypting important information held on laptops would render 
the information useless to whoever captures the laptop if it becomes lost or 
stolen. 
Question:  I Are there controls over onl ine transactions? 
Options: I YES I [ NO I I I 
Data transmitted onl ine faces a h igh risk of  being intercepted. Controls 
such as encryption and secure transmission channels should be used. 
Instant messaging is being used as a cheap reliable way for businesses to 
work together but not all instant messaging applications offer the 
appropriate level of privacy a company might require. Some do allow some 
fine tuning of the security sett ings and this should always be looked at to 
ensure that channels are encrypted when necessary ,  conversations are 
saved in a secure environment or not at al l .  file transfers are virus checked 
and the application does not automatically log on start up. 
Traffic in and out of the company's network should be monitored. Firewalls 
can be set to restr ict certain types of traffic. Web browsers allow the 
adjusting of security levels and this can be used to help restrict staff 
Internet access . Records of instant messaging conversations can be saved 
along with  a record of what files have been transferred.  
Question :  I Are there safeguards from data corruption? 
_Qptions : l ___y_�§_j I I ' r __J;NO --�------; 
Is data reviewed regularly to check it's retrievab le? The pace of IT renders 
fi les unreadable within a few years. Floppy disks are no longer used in new 
machines and would soon be obsolete. 
A large sized external dr ive p romises the longest l i fe for digital data at this 
moment. The interface , a USB plug , should be able to interface with future 
machines if only via adapters. 
Whenever the company changes computing equipment it has to consider 
the formats of its present information and if they are supported by the new 
techno logy. If not , a transferring exercise should be done as a priority 
before the host machine suffers some form of damage that renders a ll the 
resident data useless. 
Question: Are there uidelines for res stem faul ts?  
0 tions : YES NO 
Staff should recognise when a problem requires expert attention. A 'hands 
off' policy shou ld be the default best practice if staff are not trained to 
handle IT secu rity incidents . An untrained person can easily make worse 
and incident or remove vital evidence in an attem t to fix an a arent 
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problem. 
Turning off a computer is not a lways the best way to deal with an incident 
because this may lead to a permanent loss of data which may include 
forensic evidence of the security breach&. 
Someone t rained in the handling of such incidents would be better 
prepared to make the correct decisions . For example when a n  I nternet­
borne attack is detected it is best to disconnect the machine from the 
I nternet and a lso q ua rantine it from other mach ines in the company. Th is 
course of action might not be obvious to someone without training. 
Experts should deal with system faults as an untrained person can do more 
damage to a most vital part of a company's operational assets . An expert 
also ensures that faults are dealt with speed i ly .  
Small companies are probably better off hiring this sort of support when 
needed rather than maintain ing a specialist or reta in ing a support package 
from vendors. The best option would be to tra i n  a member of staff in 
additional skills that would help the company in IT emergencies. 
Question : I ls someone i n  charge of system operations? 
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Someone skilled in the technology of networks with an awareness of 
security should be responsible for the safe operation of the system. With a 
smal l  n umber of staff it might  not be possible to have a specialist position 
but someone should take the responsibility and control of system 
operations . Anyone working in or with the company would then have one 
person to go to in matters related to the company's IT operation . 
Up to date documentation of the system helps users get the most out of its 
intended use. Without these documents the company is dependent on 
experts to handle a ll manner of incidents. Documents should be ava ilable 
to authorised staff on a shared drive with new versions of the documents 
saved along with older versions. Older versions should be kept to provide 
evidence of the recommended procedures staff should have used at a 
particular time in the past. This sort of evidence might be needed in a court 
of law. 
Question : I ls there a set log-on procedure? 
Options :  I YES I I NO I I I 
The servers and computers should be password protected . The logon 
window can be coded to give a concise reminder of the need for security 
awareness when using the company's systems . Systems can be adjusted 
to require a logged off user to log on if he wishes to turn off the computer. 
In  this way an authorised user cannot turn off someone's computer . 
Question : Are transactions re ed? 
0 tions :  YES 
.
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All network activity should be logged and these records should be kept safe 
from any form of tampering . System owners should review these logs
periodically looking for activities that may jeopard ise the safety of the 
system. Sites visited , request made to the server, accounts set up are 
. some of the activity areas that may contain risky transactions. 
! 
Question: I Are error  logs monitored? 
Options: I YES I I NO I------'-----'----�I I 
I t  is important  that the error logs are kept secured f rom any malicious 
alterations .  They should a lso be regularly reviewed to check for usage 
anomalies. Encryption would help keep them unreadable in the event they 
fall in the wrong hands. The primary goal is to ensure the integrity of the 
logs. 
Operation aud it logs record changes made to records and system files. 
They must be secured from alterat ion because a system owner needs to 
know the state of the system and these logs record what has been done. 
Logs  would record the installation of new applications some of which might 
be needed for a very short period and if deleted after use would return 
resources to the system. Without an updated log , old inactive applications 
can con tinue  to exact a toll on the company's IT system. 
E-mail and the Worldwide Web 
Question : Are there controls for download ing data from the Internet? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Fi les should be downloaded to a secure area on the network . Licences for 
software must be current .  Staff should have training  in a secure procedure 
for receiving files and information from the I nternet . Firewall sett ings help in  
controll i ng what type of  traffic comes to the network from the I nternet. 
Browsers have security options that can restrict the content a company 
allows onto its network 
•
Question :  I ls i nternet traffic fi l tered for inappropriate mater ia l? 
Options: I YES I I NO I I I 
Firewalls can be used to filter certain material from the I nternet. Staff 
should also have guidelines on dealing wi th the acceptance of material 
from the I n ternet .  Aside from the morals of viewing pornographic material 
online there is a serious danger of allowing viruses onto the network as 
hackers use pornography to ship v i ruses. The law also forbids the v iewing 
of certain types of images and if evidence of these is found on a mach ine 
the owner of the business would be liable to criminal prosecution 
Restrict ing Internet traffic to a company's network is also a way of 
preventing the wastage of company time as the volume of information and 
activity on the I nternet can prove quite seductive to undiscipli ned staff. 
\ 
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1 Question: Are gu ide l ines i n  place for cert ify ing the orig i n  of 
documents? I 
Opt ions :  YES I I NO I I I 
Documents can easily be falsified and used to mislead staff to making 
incorrect decisions . This also applies to softwa re from third parties. 
i 
Question: I s&/ was security a des ign  concern when developing the I 
com pany's webs ite? 
Options: YES I I NO i I I 
I 
Websites can have many vul nerabilities and act as a ga teway to a 
compa ny's network .  The main concern is the security of the input  
information from website users. I 
j Question: Is there a pol icy for the handl i ng of emai l? i 
Options: YES I I NO i I I 
Storage of email can be expensive . A policy as  to what gets saved would 
help staff decide what to reta in. Staff should also be tra ined to exercise 
caution when receiving emails. Do not preview mail from suspicious 
sources . 
Question: Are d igi ta l  s ignatures used? 
Options : YES I NO I I I 
Digital signatures help with ensuring the authenticity and validity of emails. 
It is adv isable for company to make use of this technology that is ava ilable 
in the main email a pplications . .  I 
Telephones & Fax 
i Question: Is extra security taken when using telecommun ication? 
Options : YES I I NO i I I 
The telephone is unfortunately a social engineering tool and staff need to 
be certain of the identity of whoever is on the other end of a telephone
conversation. Policies can help by describing procedures for au thenticating 
caller Ids over the telephone and on video conferences. 
Conference and video calls can expose more data than is  available or 
needed v ia  other mediums . Keep all priva te data away from cameras and 
brief staff about the content of their conversations . There should a lso be a 
protocol for staff behav iour during conference calls that would present a 
professional impression and  avoid g iving away any company information. 
Data Management 
Question : I s  data that is  received on disks checked for v i ruses? I 
Options : YES I I N O  I I I I 
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New data received on d isks should be opened in a secure environment 
preferably outs ide of the company's network .  
Question: I ls there a pol icy for archiv ing doc uments? 
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Documents should be archived securely and checked annually for their 
readability. I n formation technology is rendering storage mediums obsolete 
in a short space of time and it is important that the correct equ ipment for 
retrieving data is main tained . 
A policy regarding the retention of data would help determine which 
information should be kept for how long and the level of security needed . 
Question :  Is there a pol icy for updating c ustomer  i nformation? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Customer data must be kept current . The DPA lists this as o ne of its 
requirements . Outdated data is a business '  inconven ience and also a 
record source of a customer's past actions  that can be used to create an 
identity closely related to that of the customer .  
Question :  Are staff tra ined about us ing customer  and other third 
party fi les? I 
Options : YES I I NO I I I 
Customer and third party data should only be used for the purpose it is 
intended . Companies are not allowed to test software with individuals' data. 
Within the company the staff should be always aware of security when 
creating files and folders . The facility is availab le on major office 
applications to add security settings to documents and to their file 
structures. Very sensitive documents can be encrypted in storage making it 
difficult to read if all other defences have been breached .  
Question: When data is exchanged, are the security measures of 
other com pan ies checked? 
Options :  YES I I NO I I I 
Third party arrangements should be written to a contract to protect the 
company . Before sharing information with a th ird party the company should 
investigate what actions would be carried out on its data and the location of 
the data . Companies need to exchange information about their security 
measures and create secure working environments for the data that is 
transmitted between them. 
Project management systems are regularly used to hand le collaborative 
ventures but theses appl icat ion can have security vulnerabilities that should 
be checked before use. A risk analysis would inform both parties if the 
· '  
65 
, 
applicat ion is secure enough for the purposes required. 
The services outsourced to third parties should be checked for the level of 
security they provide for the data that they would l i kely handle and for what 
l ikely effect the processed information  would have on the company's 
system when it is re-in trod uced to the network . 
Question :  Could system controls be overridden to amend data in  a 
control led manner? 
Options :  YES I I NO I I I 
Sometimes information needs to be amended in order to correct data that 
might be confirmed with i n  the system. This right should be given to 
someone accountable. 
Backup, Recovery and Archiving 
Question : Is data from portable computers backed up? 
' "Options : YES I I NO I I I ' ", ,
To secure the continuity of business ,  info rmation  gathered on laptops , 
PDAs or  other portable devices should be backed up in the event of loss or 
theft . 
Question :  Is someone i n  charge of backu p  and recovery of company 
data? 
Options :  YES I I NO I I I 
This should be assigned to a staff member who would record the backup 
procedure and a schedule. This person has to account for the backup of 
the company's data : 
Security awareness among staff is the key to maintaining a protective 
environment for the company's data. Backing up data on a regular basis 
helps a company survive a current data loss . Staff should be assigned 
folders on the network where they can store copies of their work on  a 
regular basis . Regular reviews of staff backups should be conducted. 
Document Handling 
Question :  Are staff trained about secure document manaaement? 
IOptions: YES I I NO I I I 
Staff should feel responsible for the safety of the information they handle. 
They should be aware of the hazards associated with certain types of 
transactions and know how to safeguard data from these threats . 
O tions: YES 
Documents should go through a formal approval procedu re before being 
sent out of the corn on its behalf. Di · · na tures hel 
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! ownership. 
Questio n :  Are there rocedures for the fil i n  of data? 
i O t ions : YES N O  
[ Staff must know what data should be filed and the level o f  security needed 
i to protect that data. 
Securing Data 
I Question: Is  the delet ion of data created&/ owned by others 
prevented? I 
,------t-----L
i Options: YES I I NO  I I I
I Data ownership and proper back up procedures help avoid the damage 
I done by the accidental deletion of data. 
I Question: ' Is customer i nformation ke t confidential? 
0 t ions: YES NO 
Care must be taken t o  secure customers' private data .  If stored it should be 
encrypted and password protected. The data should be transported over 
secured channels and not passed among staff withou t  d ue diligence 
Q uestion: Is the secu rity level of th i rd parties equal to those of the 
corn an ? 
0 tions :  YES NO 
The security o f  a company's outsourcing partners shou ld at least match the 
levels of the company as data is shared between them. 
Sharing information with a third party company can present risks to the 
, safety of the data shared. Companies working together should establish 
! baselines for security among themselves . 
i Question: ! Are documents assword rotected? 
1 0 tions : YES NO 
I
' Documents can be password protected and this shou ld be done according 
to the classification level of the document. 
I Q uestion: Are asswords recorded and secure l  
0 tions : YES NO 
I There are products available for storing passwords with the protection of 
I one password In databases passwords should be encrypted . 
Other Information Handling and Processing 
Question: Are the proper  procedures observed when checking 
customer credit data? 
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Options: I YES I I N O  I I I 
Customer cred it data can be gotten from a cred it report company .  Each 
application for cred it should be handled individually . I t  is also helpfu l to 
check the customer's own references . 
Question: Are staff aware of the security r isks associated with 
speaking to c ustomers? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
The identity and intention of customers m ust be verified before staff g ive 
information that can be used to the detriment of the company .  
Question : Are staff tra i ned to exerc ise d i l igence whi le  away on 
business? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
There should be gu idelines as to the best safety practises with regard to 
equipment and information for staff on business trips. Laptops for example 
should a lways be secu red . 
Q uestion: Are d uties separated among staff with some activities 
performed as a team? 
Options :  YES I I NO 1 I I 
I t  is best to divide the duties and hence access righ ts of ind ividuals across 
the company .  Splitt ing a task among a team makes it impossible for one 
person to act u n ilaterally . 
5. PURC HAS ING AND MAINTAIN ING COMMERC IAL SOFTWARE 
Purchasing and Installing Software 
Question : Are a l l  software l icenses up to date? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
It is il legal to run software without the proper l icence. Keep an i nventory of 
software and the i r  licence ag reement . 
Software Maintenance & Upgrade 
Question :  Are secur ity issues considered before accepting 
u pgrades? 
Options: YES I I N O  I I I 
Upgrades of older software carry a risk of introducing new vulnerabil ities . A 
review of the security offerings of an upgrade should be taken into account .  
·• · , ., ,
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6. SECURING HARDWARE, PERIPHERALS AND OTH ER 
EQU IPMENT 
Purchasing and Installing Hardware 
Q uestion: I Are the security requ i rements of new hardware properly 
, considered? 
Options :  I YES I i NO I I I 
New hardware has to maintain or enhance the security levels of the 
existi ng  system. Security must be a consideration when acquiring new 
hardware. 
! Question: Is hardware tested when new to assu re proper security 
Options: 
functional ity? 
I I NO I I I 
Hardware should be tested before being implemented into the company's 
system. 
UPS1 Printers and Modems 
Question :  \ Is there a UPS for critical equ ipment? 
Options : I Y ES I I N O  I I I 
U PSs provide power temporari ly i n  the event of a power failure or 
brownout .  This gives staff the time to safely shut down all processes . 
Question: ort the UPS? 
0 tions :  
A power generator would allow the company to conduct business i n  the 
absence of the regular power supply. 
Using Secure Storage 
Question: I Are storaae areas secured? 
Options :  I Y ES I I NO I I I 
Cabinets shou ld be locked according to the level of security needed for its 
contents . High  security items should always be locked away with access 
controlled by one person Operational information  should be locked outside 
of working hours . On ly public information could remain  unprotected . 
Servers should be in locked cabinets , as shou ld all other critical equipment. 
F ire can render data useless and a company can take a long time to 
recover from such a loss. P lace important data in fireproof storage. 
Network cable can be compromised affecting the system. The cables 
should be secu red f rom tampering . 
A safe offers a higher level of protection  than a locked cabinet and limits 
access to the holders of the combination only . The company's most 
valuable items should put in a safe. The safe should be in  a secured area 
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and not exposed to being taken away by unauthorised persons. 
Other Hardware Issues 
Question :  Is data thoroughly removed before equ ipment is 
d isposed? 
Options: YES I ! NO l r I 
Data should be thorough ly removed from equ ipment before d isposal . 
Destruction of hard drives is the surest way to delete old data. There are 
disposal professionals who offer data cleaning services. 
Question :  I ls  there insurance on the hardware? 
Options: I YES I I NO I I I 
I nsurance cover can help a company replace equipment after a d isaster. 
7. COMBATING CYBER CRIME i i
[ l  
Combating Cyber Crime I ·I
I 
Q uestion : Are security safeguards in p lace to prevent attacks to the 
system? 
Options: Y ES I I NO I I I 
Access to the NETB IOS and M SRPC ports shou ld be denied. Prevent 
access to TCP ports 1 35 ,  1 39 and 445 . Also to the UDP  ports 1 35 ,  1 37 and 
445 . Active X controls shou ld be tu rned off on  b rowsers. Use a host-based 
I DS&/ I PS  to protect �qu ipmen t  inside of the network's perimeter. 
Identify the primary defence mechanisms throughout the network and verify 
that they are in use and up to date with their security patches. Good anti­
spyware software would help identify software that resident on the network 
that got past the firewall and pose a th reat to security . Anti-virus software 
must be in place and automatically updated. System scans should be ru n  
regularly . 
Anti-vi rus should be deployed on all crit ical host machines throughout the 
network . Applications that transport data should also be scanned by anti­
virus software . 
Configure intrusion detection to identify DOS attacks . Monitor resource 
usage for near full u tilisation. Disable all unnecessary services on host 
mach ines. Configu re perimeter firewalls to block all traffic that is not 
needed. 
Question: Is the anti-v i rus software u to date?  
0 t ions: YES NO 
· The features of the an ti-virus software should be verified to be a 70 
for the nature of the business before purchase . 
Updates are the solutions to the latest viruses detected by the security 
vendors . For a system to be protected against new v iruses the updates 
need to be installed as soon as they are released. Most a nti-virus software 
have automatic update facilities and this is the more secure option . 
Schedule regular automatic scans of the system 
A plan for handling attacks should be documented. Staff should be given 
an overview of how viruses work and what to do in the event of an attack ,  
e.g .  isolate infected mach ines. Security vendors give a lot of information 
and their bulletins can be excellent sources. 
Question ·  Are loopholes a n d  backdoors i nto the system investigated I 
for vu lnerabi l it ies? 
Options : YES i r NO i I i I 
Systems can be set up i n  ways other than the norm to permit access to 
system administrators. These should be kept to a min imum. 
8. CONTROLLING E-COMMERCE INFORMATION SECURITY 
E-commerce Issues 
Question: I ls the e-commerce system bui l t  on a secu re network? 
Options: I YES I NO I I I 
Networks hosting e-commerce systems require extra security as 
customers' financial details are being passed over the Internet . A secure 
site should also be available for business on a continuous basis because 
this is the expectation of customers and also 24-hour availabil i ty means 
that a user situated anywhere around the globe, at his convenience, can 
access the site. Continuous access also builds customer trust. 
E-commerce activity should be isola ted from the rest of the network, 
perhaps in a DMZ and the ecommerce site should be administered from a 
single computer that has access controls in force. Access to the website 
should also be tightened with the use of smart cards for example. 
Another option for small companies to consider when conducting on line 
sales is the use of payment providers. Such companies offer to conduct the 
entire payment process for a small fee and in the end the company gets 
the money for it goods / service without having the responsibility of 
securing the customers' financial details .  
i 
Websites like other applications are sometimes developed using 
. admin istrative rights to enable developers to control the code to a higher 
I degree. While this approach helps with  the efficiency of the development 
7 1  
process, it is not a secure practice. The level of rights should be changed 
to least privilege before the website becomes live . All backdoors and 
trapdoors should be removed. The hard coded access information should 
also be deleted from the script . 
Another reason for developers to practise working in 'least privilege' mode 
is to allow programmers to experience the application in as much the same 
way as the users . An application can exhibit different behaviours 
depending on the rights of the user and designers need to 'see' what end 
users would encounter in order to ensure that the application delivers its 
intended function when deployed. 
9. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING IN-HOUSE SOFTWARE 
Software Development 
Question: ! Is the code documented? 
Options: I YES I I NO I I I 
Documented code saves a company time when problems occur with the 
code. The original developer should make clear his approach to a problem 
though the documentation so that others can follow the log ic. 
Properly documented code protects a company from being unable to 
support its product in the event of the absence of the orig inal developer . 
Documented code makes it easier to repair problems , add functionality and 
reuse code. 
i 
Testing & Training 
Q uestion :  \ Is mock  data ava i lable for testing of software? I --,------------
O pt ions: i YES I NO I I 
The DPA requ ires that real customers' data should not be used for testing 
software . When real data is used in testing it can become labelled with a 
lower level security classification and could fall into the wrong hands. A 
safer practice is to create a mock database for testing. 
For the testing of online purchase applications. some payment providers 
provide a sandbox environment where a mock purchase would go to 
completion in the same way a real transaction would be conducted . Mock 
data can be used In the sandbox. This example coming from larger 
companies that have to deal with securing customer information sho uld 
serve as a best practice example to other developers. 
The test environment shou ld be password protected to ensu re access to 
authorised and skilled persons. 
Q uestion : I I s  regress ion testi ng carried out before i ntrod uc i ng new 
1 software? 
0 tions : YES NO 
72 
l 
Before install ing new software , tests should be run i n  a secure environment 
to verify the effects of the new software on the system and the user 
interfaces. The focus should be on the functional aspect of the code to 
ensure that recent changes have not introduced new bugs.  
A library of regression tests can be built up over the l ifetime of an 
application / system from each update event . It is not necessary to keep all 
tests in use, as th is can be a time waster. The most effective tests should 
be kept and duplication should be avoided&. 
10. DEALING WITH PREMISES RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
Premises Security 
. Question: I ls  there a n  intruder a la rm on the premises?  
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Alarms shou ld be placed on the perimeter of the building . Insurance rates 
are lower for buildings with alarms . They can also be linked to a security
company that would check the p remises when the alarm sounds. 
A panic button such as those installed in banks is a good investment as it 
involves staff making a decision as to how critical a s ituation has become. 
Staff would need training in the use of this . 
These provide evidence of intrusions and can also be set up to trigger 
alarms .  The records should be secured in the event that they are needed 
for an investigation. 
Question :  \ I s  the access to areas hous ing computers contro l led? 
Options : I YES I I NO I I I 
Offices should remain locked after hours. Staff should be trained to 
interrogate anyone who enters the build ing during working h ours . 
Computers should be secured by locking stations when users are away , 
log on procedures to the mach ines and if feasible cable locks to their 
desks . 
The ceil ing, a ir ducts and windows are weak points i n  an office's secu rity 
and should always be evaluated for security . Home based businesses can 
benefit from the level of security usually attached to a home but the 
separate value of a business' i nformation must always remain at the fore 
and information systems must remain protected from anyone outside of the 
company's staff. 
0 tions :  YES NO 
Visitors should not be left unattended when on the p remises . A procedure 
for receiving deliveries should be in  place for all staff to follow. Strangers 
should not be allowed to roam freel on a corn an 's remises . I f  a cleaner 
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works in the office after hours, a clear desk policy should be practised 
among staff who should a lso lock away all documents in a drawer or 
cabinet at  the end of each day. 
Question: Is the impact of envi ronmenta l  disasters considered when 
secu ring the premises? 
Options: YES I I N O  I I I 
The threat of an environmental d isaster should be considered when an 
office is being set up . Th is consideration would affect the placement of the 
critical equipment and what safeguards are used.  
For example , the threat of flood would lead to the locating of critical 
equipment on  as  high a placement  as considered sa fe. Bush fires, 
excessive dust, high temperatures, high humidity , sea spray and other 
natural ly occurring hazards need to be catered for when a company is 
setting up premises and wants to make sure that its data is safeguarded in 
the event of a natura l disaster . 
Data Stores 
Q uestion :  I s  staff access monitored? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Some sort of monitoring system should be in p lace.  This can be as simple 
as placing the desk of an authorised person near the data storage area or it 
can involve CCTV or e lectronic access controls that record entra nce to the 
area . 
1 1 . ADDRESSING PERSONNEL ISSUES RELATING TO SECURITY 
Contractual Documentation 
Question: Are checks made on the c la ims made by prospective 
employees of the i r  past? 
Options: YES I I NO I l I 
A condition of the employment process should be that candidates provide 
more than one reference from past employers and give the company 
permission to contact these referees. The company should check these 
references to verify the work history of the candidate and the opinion of 
past employers .  
When contacting past employers , make a clear introduction o f  the 
company, the position of the recruiter and the nature of the role being fi lled . 
The same questions should be used for a ll appl icants applying for a certain 
position and these should be open questions that do not lead the either 
way. 
Question :  Are staff requi red to  s ign individual contracts with non­
d isclosure c lauses? 
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Optio ns :  I YES I I NO  I I I 
Th is is importa nt as it makes each member of staff respons ib le fo r the i r  
act ions .  A b reach of co nfide ntia l ity can be damag i ng fo r a company .  The 
info rmat ion a company hand les can be of many types and a lth ough non­
d isc losu re c lauses a re gu ided by the interna l  c lassificat io n ,  other  
info rmation m ig ht have va lue to  outs iders .  
Emp loyees shou ld have a clea r dema rcat ion between the work they do  i n  
the bus i ness and  what happens outside o f  t h e  company .  
No n-d isclosu re cla uses a lso p rotect the  company from ex-emp loyees us ing 
p roprietary i nfo rmation  to  he lp  a competito r. Trade secrets , code ,  strateg ic 
docu ments ,  customer l i sts and  emp loyees' i n format ion a re examp les of 
i nfo rmat ion that an ex-emp loyee might  be p rivy too but shou ld not d isclose 
to others u pon leav ing the company . 
I n  some compa n ies , emp loyees a re sent on 'garden i ng leave ' norma l ly 
th ree months befo re the i r  leav ing date to deny them the opportu n ity to 
gather  i n te l l igence that m ig ht be usefu l to another company or  perhaps 
damag ing  to the fi rm if exposed . 
Confidential Personnel Data 
Questio n :  I ls staff data held i n  a secure storage a rea? 
Opt ions :  I YES I I NO  I I I 
H R  records shou ld be kept i n  a locked cab i net w ith access l im ited to 
authorised department staff on ly .  The DPA catego rises d ata such as eth n ic 
or ig i n ,  hea lth , re l ig ion , sexua l  o rientat ion and crim ina l  record as sensit ive 
i n formation  and  shou ld  be treated as such . 
Staff records shou ld be afforded a p rotect ion leve l su ited to its class ificat ion 
that wou ld ensu re on ly the authorised peop le i n  a company can v iew such 
data . A locked cabi net , password protected fi les , encrypt io n ,  password 
p rotected mach i nes a re some steps that can he lp  secu re th i s  type of 
i nfo rmation . 
Q uestion :  I Are staff subject to security c lea rance checks? 
Opt ions :  I YES I I NO I I I 
Security c lea rance checks shou ld be done th roug hout  an  emp loyee 's t ime 
with a company .  I t  is not enough fo r th is  to be done on ly at h i r i ng  t ime . 
Pe riod ic rev iews of entit lements wou ld revea l  the access creep than ca n 
happen due  to the need to fac i l itate part ic ipat ion i n  p rojects ru n by the 
compa ny .  
Staff clearance shou ld be logged and reg u la rly p resented fo r rev iew to  the 
staff member. I f  rig hts a re no longer needed they shou ld be revoked . A 
practice of g ive n access on  a ' need to know' basis wou ld  he lp  keep a t ig ht 
re ign on the secu rity c learances a l l owed . 
Compan ies a lso work on the assumpt ion that one secu rity clearance check 
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at hiring based on a background check is not a valid dynamic evaluation of 
an employee's trust level . Trust levels are not treated as constants and 
need regular review and updating . 
Personnel Information Security Responsibilities 
Question: I s  someone responsible for the security of the company's 
cred it cards? 
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Authorised staff members should handle purchases made on the 
company's credit cards. The details of the cards should be kept secret. 
Trusted suppl iers are also a better approach to the company's purchase 
plans as it means that the company's credit detai ls are stored in fewer 
places. 
The sharing of card details like P INs and online passwords should not be 
allowed as these credentials are usually val id for the life of the card which 
might be longer than staff tenure. If staff access rights are properly 
mon itored , the departure of a staff member can prompt the chang ing of a 
card's identity credentials. 
The company should have a record of which suppliers have their credit 
details and regularly perform changes to passwords and probably P IN s. 
12. DELIVERING TRAIN ING AND STAFF AWARENESS 
Awareness 
Question: Is there a staff security awareness programme i n  place? 
Options : YES . l  I NO I I ! 
For information security policies to be successful within a company, the 
staff must have a high appreciation of the relevance of such measures. 
Posters , vendors' bu llet ins ,  security workshops , short articles about 
security, books in the compan y's library and subscriptions to on line forums 
are some ways to raise the security awareness level of the entire company. 
An awareness program would be most effective if designed to address the 
way that information technology is used in the company. This means that 
there is no one-size-fits-all solu tion to train ing of staff. l n  a smal l .  one office 
company it might be sufficient for the owner to regularly include the topic in 
casual conversations where staff feedback can easi ly be accepted. This 
approach might be considered too informal in another setting where the 
use of policy and scheduled train ing sessions might be needed to drive 
home the importance of security awareness. 
Training 
Questio n :  Is i nformation security addressed when tra in ing staff onl 
new s stems? 
0 tions: YES N O  
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New equipment&/ software can i ntroduce new vulnerabilities or new ways of 
securing information .  Staff should be trained about the security issues 
before a new system is  put in place. When testing, attention should be 
given to possible vulnerabilities such as how much access does logg ing in 
to the new system al low with respect to the entire network . The security 
treatment of data from the network might be different in the new system 
and secure work-arounds should be devised . 
13.  COMPLYING  WITH LEGAL AND POLICY REQUIREMENTS 
Complying with Legal Obligations 
Q uestion: Are there controls on what data is copied and  distributed Iamong staff? I 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Information d istr ibution should be tightly control led . The more copies there 
are of data the harder it becomes to control the security of a piece of 
i nformation.  An outdated copy of a record can re-enter the system and 
corrupt present data . 
Working collaboratively from a common file i s  more efficient and more 
secure than working on separate cop ies and hav ing to u pdate each with 
the latest changes . Access rights to documents should also be kept u nder 
control. I f  a staff member just needs to read the data then that i s  all the 
rights that should be g iven. I f  the document is to be distributed it can be 
password protected from changes and sent out as a read only file . 
Question: l I s  the company registered u nder the DPA? 
Options: I YES I I NO I I I 
The DPA requires that companies that record on computer. the personal 
data of customers must reg ister with the Office of the Data Protection 
Commissioner. 
Personal data relates to: 
(i) racial origin 
( i i )  political opinions or rel ig ious beliefs, 
(iii )  physical or mental health (other than any such data reasonably kept by 
them in relation to the physical or mental health of their employees in the 
ord i nary course of personnel admin istration and not used or disclosed for 
any other purpose) , 
(iv) sexual life , or 
(v) criminal convictions. 
The legis lat ion also requires registration of businesses that wholly or 
main ly col lect debts. The aim of reg istration is to put into the publ ic domain 
the type of i nformation that is collected and the reasons for doing so.  
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Options: 
Complying with Policies 
Question: Are there i nternal audits to c heck the level of compl iance 
to the security policy? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
Procedures for checking the level of compliance shou ld be prepared and 
made known to staff. A security audit can be considered the fina l  step in 
the implementation of l n foSec defences. 
After the policy has been decided and the defence measures put in p lace 
an aud it is used to check the level of effectiveness of the previous actions. 
The audit checks that the entire security process is effective in protecting 
the data of the company.  
An audit can show up such shortcomings as poorly tu ned firewalls or I DSs. 
A company might buy itself security products and&/ or security consultation 
and consider that the work is done and they are now secure from any 
threats to the data . This cannot  be taken from granted and a n  audit helps 
prove what the RO I on  the security spending is . 
A smal l  company that has a security policy in p lace can do an audit in­
house. I f  for examp le the pol icy demands staff create strong passwords 
and change them every three months, an audit of the log- in  over a four 
month period would show whether staff are adhering to the policy . 
Avoiding Litigation 
Question: Are the proper  copyr ight permissions sought before us i ng 
i nternet mater ia l?  
YES I I NO I I l 
Information on the I nternet carries the same copyrigh t  restrictions as 
pri nted materia l .  I f  the business needs to use any  information published by 
another author for financial gain, it should first seek the author's 
permission. 
There is not one sure way of obtaining permission to use copyrighted 
material and the correct procedu re depends on the type of materia l  being 
used . The Copyright Legislat ive Agency is a good place to start making 
inqu iries for bus inesses based in the UK . 
Other Legal Issues 
Q uestion: Is  legal gu idance sought in  the handl ing of i nformation 
security breaches? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
A company sho uld have legal advice on the handling of information 
security issues. The company shou ld choose lawyers who have expertise 
in this field . 
The first step is to delegate someone in the company to be the first point of 
contact for staff when they discover a security breach. Th is person must 
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have knowledge of the legal requirements of dealing with a security breach 
and how to keep the evidence intact. 
When the situation is contained the company can hand over the evidence 
to its lawyers in the event that the incident has to be taken further through a 
court process. 
Question: Is there a periodic review of the compl iance levels of the 
ent i re system? 
Options: YES I I NO I I I 
The company shou ld annually review its security policy. Within that time 
the changes to the information systems should be recorded and if need be 
used to amend the secu rity policy. 
A review of the ent ire system's compliance should be done along with the 
annua l  policy review to prove the effectiveness of the policies and 
countermeasures used . When the internal review is done and the amended 
policy proves effective it should be reviewed by a legal expert before being 
considered approved for use. 
14. DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO IS INCIDENTS 
Reporting Information Security Incidents 
Q uestion: Are staff aware of the i r  duty to report i nformation security 
breaches? 
Options : YES ! I NO I I I 
This should be included in the information security policy. Increasing 
legislation is insisting that security breaches be reported because the idea 
is that businesses would pay more attention to information security if they 
are requ i red to report any breaches .  Companies having to report security 
incidents that put  that customers data at risk stand to lose a lot of money 
and therefore the case for better security becomes more of a business 
decision than a technical one. 
Including the staff's responsibility to report breaches i n  the security policy 
that is signed on recruitment makes it clear that the company expects 
everyone to play a part in the defence of all information. 
The policy should also state that fai lure to report incidents would be 
punishable. This helps reinforce the perception that the company is serious 
about data protection .  
Question: Is there a formal re 
0 tions: YES 
A documented procedu re for  handl ing incidents shou ld include the 
h ierarchy of responsibility and whom staff should report to . 
A formal recess removes doubt as to what to do when an incident is 
I 
I 
i 
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detected and to whom it should be reported. The process should be 
des igned to encourage reporting while protecting the whistle blower 
because it must be remembered that there is a higher chance of the 
company's information being threatened from within . Issues with staff 
. members should be handled confidentially. 
Corrective Activity 
Question: Is there a database of past i nformation security breaches 
and thei r solutions?  
· Options : YES I I NO I I I 
Records of past incidents should be kept and used in reviews of how 
incidents were handled. Properly reported incidents can also serve as 
examples when t raining staff about the importance of information security. 
Recorded incidents would give a history of the steps taken to improve the 
system's security and provide reference points if ever there is the need to 
roll back the security level of the system in the event of a major  change to 
the system. 
15 .  PLANNI NG FOR BUSINESS CONTINU ITY 
Business Continuity Management 
0 t ions : YES NO 
The threats to  a business' continued operation could come from many 
different areas. Threats can be natural or man-made. Businesses must 
have a plan as to how to continue operating in the event of a disa ster. The 
plan must envisage different likely scenarios and document procedures to 
ensure that the company continues to operate . 
D ifferent staff members can be responsible for implementing different parts 
of the recovery of operations. A separate backup location should be 
chosen to use if the normal office was damaged. I 
: The BCP should be available to all staff members. Posting the BCP on the 
I company's int ra net is a good idea. The plan should be tested end-to-end at 
· least annually , run under as nea r authentic conditions as feasible. 
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6 Summary 
The Internet is increasing ly used for commerce and th is has g iven 
businesses international and unlim ited access to customers . Websites are 
no longer exclusively brochure sites for companies and now offer users 
the ability to interact w ith others for work , commerce and socializing. All 
these activities require the processing of personal data rang ing from a 
username and password to banking information to personal h istories .  
Securing the data processed by the web-applications is very important for 
the trust a company wou ld l ike its customers to have in ability to keep their 
details private and also to prevent itself from attack from cyber-criminals. 
Web applications are particularly vulnerable because Internet traffic is 
a llowed through most firewalls and an attacker can piggyback an 
appl ication and ga in entry to a company's data . The STR I D E  model is 
used to assess the standard threats posed to a web application. For each 
threat a set of technical countermeasures have been l isted giving  
developers methods for  strengthening the code beh ind web-appl icat ions. 
The methods of code production have changed to reflect the complexity of 
the projects and the demand for more secure appl ications . The challenge 
is to provide development teams with a method that allows the code to be 
produced in as short a t ime as possible and as secure as can be. The 
methodology provided in this thesis allows regular auditing , via the use of 
a matrix , of the code while it is being written . 
The matrix maps the progress made in adding countermeasu res to 
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safeguard the application. The steps taken are guided by tests that are run 
on the application at the p roduct ion point of each function with in the 
appl ication. The overarching method is called Secure-by-Design and is 
meant to produce applications that a re secure in a shorter space of time 
than other t rad itional production cycles . 
The securing of web applications and a proposed method of p roduction 
are presented as one of the offerings of this thesis. Supporting these is a 
tool to help businesses secure their information systems that goes beyond 
the appl ication level and involves all the data used by the organisation. 
The too l is based on the laws and standards that apply to U K  companies . 
The laws apply to all businesses and ind ividuals who handle personal data 
of customers .  The threats to customers include credit card f raud , 
unwanted ha rassment and identity theft . The standards  a lso apply to al l 
who process and store customer data but the assumptions made by the 
standards suggest that the big businesses are the target audience for 
these best practice guides. 
This section of the thesis brings together the mandatory laws and the best 
practices outlined in the h ighest industry standard ,  I SO27001&, and creates 
a 99 po int questionnaire that smal l  businesses can use to form policies 
and procedu res to protect the data they work with . 
The q uestions used in the lnfoSec Checkl ist a re the f inal distillation of the 
o rig inal 367 items in I SO2700 1 (Append ix E) .  The c riteria came from a 
combination of two laws that are compulsory for UK  businesses and three 
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categories that ranked each ISO27001 item as being of H IGH , MED IUM or 
LOW p racticality for a small bus iness. The LOW items were deleted 
because they were considered a poor return on  security investment. The 
remaining items were screened for duplication with an aim of b ringing the 
questionnaire to less than one hundred items . 
This questionnaire can act as a pro forma for an audit of a company's 
information security status . The items address the legal compliance and 
the other h ighly p ractical steps that can be put in place to secure a 
company's i n formation .  With a predominantly YES / NO choice of answers 
to the questions it is easy to gauge the company's security on a 
percentage basis . 
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7 Discussion 
We've discussed the need fo r  Information Secur ity i n  any business that 
stores and processes data. The Internet has made interaction between 
people and systems more ubiquitous than ever before and in order to 
protect that data, laws and standards have been drawn up that g ive 
businesses gu idelines in to securing information. 
The growth of the I nternet is assured for the foreseeable future and 
businesses and developers are putting new commercial models into play 
constantly .  An example begin search eng ine technology which was first 
developed without a commercial model but has since gained such 
prevalence that income streams eventual ly evolved and now many sites 
use pay-per-cl ick and other search-related revenue bu ilders. 
Cyber crime would continue to increase because criminals would find the 
lack of a physical engagement attractive . Whi le d igital forensic 
investigations are still a relatively new and special ized field , criminals 
would rate favourably their chances of being u ndetected. 
I SO2700 1 is a highly respected lnfoSec standard and therefore any audit 
based on the items l isted i n  the standard should yie ld a resu lt that is 
comparable to what is required for a safe environment  for data.  The format 
of th is Check List makes it easier for a company to do an aud it ,  get a 
resu lt and then implement the recommended actions needed for a h igher 
score .  
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lnfoSec is not a static activity where a company can ever say their data is 
1 00% percent secure .  If a business achieves full marks on the C heck L ist, 
it can on ly be regarded as a short pause for celebration as criminals are 
investing constantly to find new ways to gain control of business 
information.  The Check List acts as a g uide to secu ring information and 
inesses that wish towould be an excellent starting point for small bus
operate legally and treat l nfoSec seriously . 
85 
8 Future Work 
The work done in this thesis addresses two important trends in the 
commercial world. The use of information technology to automate 
business activity and the increase in the n umber of small businesses 
trading in n iche markets and sharing an equal presence in the new market 
fronts of the Internet with o lder bigger b usinesses . 
The Check List can be further improved by weighting the scoring to reflect 
the importance of the legislative items. Audit tabulations would yield 
recommendations in order of legal priority followed by the practicality of an 
item. This can be used as a software tool that would help busi nesses keep 
their information systems secure on  a continual basis because answering 
the questions ,  getting  a rating and suggestions for improvement  would be 
simple. 
A website can host · the Check List and all supporting information that 
would explain first the need for a regular audit of the company's data 
protection and secondly how to go about a security audit The audit can be 
done onl ine and a sco re retu rned to the user giving a rating  and a list of 
suggestions for ways to move forward towards a more secure environment 
for the organisation's data. 
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Appendix A 
STRIDE Vulnerability Threat 
Auditing and • Repudiation 
Logging 
Authentication • Spoofing 
• Tampering 
• E levation of 
privilege 
Authorization • Spoofing 
• Tampering 
• Repudiation 
• Information 
disclosure 
Configuration 
• Elevation of 
priv ilege 
• Information 
disclosureManagement 
• Elevation of 
privi lege 
Cryptography • Tampering 
• Information 
d isclosure 
Exception 
Management 
• I nformation 
disclosure 
I nput • Denia l of 
val idation service 
Parameter 
Manipulation 
' • Tampering 
• I nformation 
Countermeasures 
Secure Log File Management policies 
used on the administrative s ide . 
• Specia l  account set up to access 
the administrative priv ileges. 
• Student group leaders have more 
rights than gro up members . 
SQL authentication between the web 
server and the database. 
• Access the database using stored 
procedures. 
• Code access secu rity through the 
roles and the p rivileges g ranted. 
• 
privileges.  
Distinct administrative and student 
• Access is  restricted from the 
student side. 
The configuration store is kept off the 
Web .  
• Strong industry standard 
cryptography. 
• Secure hashing algorithm (SHA 1 ) .  
Keys recycled reg ula rly . 
• Structured Exception Handling . 
Error messages g ive l imited 
information to the customer. 
• A l l  input is managed within only 
one page. 
• Web page input val idated .  
Argumen ts and the query strings are 
encrypted. 
• Sensitive data not passed in 
parameters. 
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disclosu re Sensit ive data not passed in query 
• Den ial of strings or form fields . 
service 
Session • Spoofing • Session lifetime is restricted. 
Management • Information Session identifiers passed over 
disclosure encrypted channels with SSL.  
. Sensitive • Storage of secrets handled with  
· Data platform-provided Data P rotection­
AP I  (DPAP I) .  
Appendix A .  Vulnerabilities ,  Threats and Countermeasures 
' • I n formation 
' disclosu re 
• 
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Appendix B 
Vulnerabi l ity 
I nput&/ Data 
Validation 
Authentication 
Authorization 
Config uration 
Management 
Proposed Techn ica l Countermeasures 
• Buffer Overflows : Tradit ional C++, C, Memory 
Overruns , handled by . NET Framework, so not an 
issue .  
• Buffer Overflows : Form Level Validat io n  (Required 
F ield . Minimum Length, Max imum Length , Custom 
Rules). 
• Buffer Overflows & SOL I njection :  Database Level 
Validat ion (DB Required , DB Min Length. DB Max 
Length , SOL Inject ion ,  Double Encod ing ) .  
• B uffer Overflows: Business Logic Val idation ,  held in 
Bus iness Logic Layer. not Web Layer . 
• Cross-Site Scripting : . N ET Framework 1 . 1 has built in 
Cross Site Scripting Protection Code. 
• SOL I njection : SOL Injection Validation performed at 
Data Access Level 
• Canon icalization: M icrosoft Canon icalization Fix 
Applied. 
• Login Retry Logic 
• Separate anonymous from authenticated pages (Use 
Bu ilt i n  Web .Config Deny Settings)  
• Encrypt communication channels to secure 
authentication tokens. 
• Use HTTPS only  with forms authentication cookies 
• Use authent1cat 1on mechanisms that do not requ ire 
c lear text credentials to be passed over the network 
• Do not store credentials .  
• Forms Authentication Sti l l  t o  be  implemented 
• Forms Authenticat ion Routines (Cookie Encryption , 
Protection ::: All) 
• Use least privilege accounts .  
• SSPI  Database Connections. 
• U nauthorized access to admin istration interfaces : No 
adm in istrative interfaces in it ial ly provided. 
• Unauthorized access to configuration stores : 
Configuration F i les are stored on the machine , and 
are encrypted (See Cryptography) .  
• U nauthorized access to configuration stores : Avo id 
storing sensitive information in the Web space (XML 
Form F i les , Configuration Files) .  
• Retrieval of  clear text configuration secrets : 
Credentials are not stored in clear text , No use of 
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Sensitive Data 
Session 
Management 
Local Security Authority (LSA) . 
• Over-priv i leged process and service accounts : Use 
least privileged service accounts (ASP . N ET account 
for website , SOL Server SSP I  account for 
application) . 
• Sensitive files not shown i n  webspace.  
• Configure to run under medium trust still needs to be 
implemented. 
• Over-privileged process and service accounts : 
Appl ication should be able to run under Medium 
Trust .  
• Lack of indiv idual accountab i lity . 
• No Hard Coded Sensitive Data in the Softwa re .  
• Encrypt sensitive data over the network. 
· • Secu re the channel. 
• Session H ijacking : Session Timeout Expiration Code 
in place. 
• Session Hijacking : Configu re Session Timeouts to a 
minimum. 
• Session Hijacking : Abi lity to configure a maximum 
number of webs ite h its w ith i n  a session . 
• Session H ijacking : Cookie Based, not Query String 
based Session Identifier. 
• Session Hijacking & Man in the Middle Attacks: SSL .  
• Session H ijacking & Session Replay : Abil ity to 
. configure an absolute Session Expiry on top of the 
sliding expirat ion .  
• Session Replay: C ritical Functions {such as  Online 
Contract sig n ing) , require a revalidation of 
C redentials . 
• Avoid storing sensitive data in session stores. 
• Secure the channel to the session store. 
• Authenticate and authorize access to the session 
sto re. 
• Enhance F ramework's support for Session 
Management, if using Windows Authentication rather 
than the current forms authentication . This is 
because we uti lise the Encryption ,  Verification & 
MAC ,  built i nto the . NET F ramework for forms 
authentication . 
• Forms Authentication still to be implemented. 
• Session Hijacking & Man in the Middle Attacks: 
Forms Authenticat ion Cookies set to P rotection=AI I  
(Encrypted , Verified, MAC) .  
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Cryptography 
Parameter 
, Manipulation 
Exception 
Management 
Aud iting & 
: Logging 
• Use Microsoft Enterprise Library Encryption Routines 
where possible. 
• Encryption of Configuration Files. 
• Encryption of Sensitive Data in the Database (where 
appropriate) . 
• U RL Encryption . 
• Cookie Encryption .  
• E ncrypted Communication Channe ls. 
• Encrypted Viewstate. 
• . NET Web Application Configuration F iles are 
encrypted using the Microsoft Enterprise L ibrary 
Configuration I Encryption rout ines. 
• Avoid key management. Use the Windows Data 
Protection API ( DPAPI )  where appropriate. 
• Query string man ipulation : URL  Encryption. 
, • Form field manipulation : See Inp ut Validat ion 
Section 
. • Form Field Manipulation: Viewstate Encryption . 
• Cookie man ipu lation : Only Authentication Cookies 
are used, which are secured. 
• All Manipulation: Use of SSL. 
• A l l  Man ipu lation :  Avoidance of storing sensitive data. 
• All Manipulation : Non Reliance of passed data . 
• Revealing  sensitive system or application details :  
Use of Default Error Page , so where an un-handled 
. exception fi l ters through,  a custom error page is 
displayed. 
• Revealing sensitive system or application details: 
Passwords and sensitive data will not be published to 
the Error Publ ishing Log. 
• Use structured exception handling (by using try I 
catch blocks) . 
• Catch and wrap exceptions only if the operation adds 
value I information . 
. • Failed Log ins etc automatically logged 
· • Form Level Logg ing avai lable to Form Bu ilders. 
· • E rror Publishing still to be Implemented. 
• All Security Exceptions  / Un-hand led Exceptions are 
pub lished to the Error Publishing Web Service (and if 
it's not ava i lab le to the Event log) . 
Appendix B. Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures 
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Appendix C 
I nformation Security Pol icy Sample 
<<Company>> Information Systems Security Program 
ASSET MANAGEMENT 
1 .  SUBJ ECT: 
Ali information assets must be tracked and managed to ensure that they 
are not lost or misused 
2. SCOPE: 
This policy applies to al&l <<Company>> information assets, including but 
not limited to workstations , servers, network devices, printers, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs) ,  phones, software, and licenses. 
access to data stored on or accessed through these assets, and could 
have a detrimental effect on the reputation of the a gency. Addit ionally, the 
tracking and management of information assets is mandated by several 
those mentioned in the scope above . 
( 1 ) Information assets are to be added to the record upon receipt by 
<<Company>> and assigned a barcode. 
3. DESCRIPTION:  
Each year ,  thousands of information assets are lost or  stolen. Often 
agencies simply lose track of these items, sometimes resulting in scandals 
that appear in the news. and at minimum incurring the wrath of auditing 
organizations. Not only would loss of information assets result in a 
financial impact on <<Company>> , but it could a lso result in unauthorized 
national regulations, such as the Data Protection Act .  
4. PROCEDURES & GUIDELINES: 
(a) <<Company>> must keep a record of all information assets , including 
(2) For each information asset, <<Company>> will track at least the 
following information: 
• The date of receipt of the item 
• Date the record was last updated or inventoried 
date of disposal , the method of disposa l 
• The brand , model, and type of asset 
• Serial number a nd <<Company>>  barcode 
• The person to whom the asset is assigned 
• The location of the asset 
• Any maintenance agreements for the asset 
(3) Upon disposal of an information asset , 
(e.g . ,  transfer, destruction, 
<<Company>> w ill track the 
donation, etc . ) ,  and the name of the new owner (if there is one). 
(b) Periodic inventories are to be performed to ver ify records and account 
for all information assets . 
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( 1 )  Each asset is to be i nventoried at least annually . 
5. ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES: 
(a) Information Owners are responsible for inventorying , tracking , and 
protecting <<Company>> information resources that they own.  
(b) I n formation Custodians are responsible for assisting information 
owners with inventorying, tracking, and protecting <<Company>> 
information resources in their care. 
(c) Information Users are responsible for exercising due diligence in 
protecting information resources entrusted to them , and immediately 
reporting the loss , theft or damage of any <<Company>> information 
resource. 
(d) Supervisors are responsible for ensuring their employees 
SSO) is responsible for 
understand 
their responsibilities regarding protection of i nformation resources . 
(e) The I nformation Systems Security Officer ( I&
aud iting to ensure that information assets are being tracked and managed 
in accordance with this policy. 
6. DEF IN ITIONS:  
(a) Information Asset - An information resource that has tangible value. 
action, 
(b) Information Resource - The procedures, equipment facilities, software 
and data that are designed , built , operated and mainta ined to collect. 
record, process , store, retrieve. d isplay and transmit information. 
7. ENFORCEMENT: 
Violation of this policy could result in loss or l imitations on use of 
information resources , as well as disciplinary and / or legal 
including termina tion of employment or referral for crimi nal p rosecution . 
8. POINT OF CONT ACT : 
I nformation Systems Security Officer ( ISSO) 
9 .  ATTACHMENTS: 
None 
1 0. AUTHORITY: 
(a) <<Company>> Directive 00-0 1 &, Information Systems Security Program. 
(b) Data Protection Act . 
(c) Computer M isuse Act. 
(d ) I SO 2700 1 .  
1 1 .  LOCATION: 
A Copy of this pol icy is available on <<Company>> i ntranet at 
https ://forexample/issp.pdf 
1 2. EFFECTIVE DATE: 
1 5th January 2007 
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1 3 . REVISION H ISTORY: 
1 4th January 2008 
1 4. REVIEW SCH EDULE: 
This policy shou ld be reviewed and updated annually. 
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Appendix 0 
Example of a suite of tests 
TEST 
2005 _ 2006Accepted 
2005_2006AcceptOffer 
. 2005_2006AcceptOfferBlank 
01  
2005_2006AcceptOfferBlank 
02 
2005_2006AcceptOfferLong 
Pwd 
2005 _2006AcceptOfferLong 
User 
2005 _2006AcceptOfferShort 
Pwd 
2005_2006AcceptOfferShort 
User 
2005 2006Offered 
2005 _2006AcceptOfferSOL  
Pwd 
2005 _ 2006AcceptOfferSO L 
User 
2005 _ 2006AcceptOfferSO L 
UserPwd 
2005 _ 2006Accept0fferStore 
· dProcPwd 
2005 _2006AcceptOfferStore 
dProcUser 
AcceptContract 
login Blank 
login Lockout 
. loginlockoutCoded 
log inLongPwd 
log inlongU ser 
login Page 
login ShortPwd 
loginShortUser 
loginSOLPwd 
log inSOLUser 
log inSQLUserPwd 
DESCRIPTION 
Test layout of  Accommodation Offer 
Details page. 
Layout of Contract page . 
Accept with all blank checkboxes . 
Accept w ith n ine checkboxes. 
Accept with password > 20 characters . 
Accept with username > 20 characters. 
Accept with password < 6 cha racters. 
Accept with username 
Test layout of Offer page. 
SO L  Injection code in Password input box 
(' OR 1 = 1 --) 
< 6 characters. 
SOL Injection code in User input box. 
SOL Injection code in User and Password 
input box. 
box 
Stored Procedure code in Password input 
Stored Procedure code in User input box . 
Test layout of Signed contract page. 
Log in w/o credentials .  
Log in with invalid credentials five times . 
Log in with invalid credentials five times . 
Log in with password > 20 characters .  
Log in with username > 20  characters. 
Test layout of Login page .  
Login with password < 6 characters . 
Login with username < 6 characters . 
SOL Injection code in Password input box 
(' OR 1 = 1 --) . 
SQL Injection code in User input box . 
SQL Injection code in User and Password 
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input box . 
login Sto redP rocPwd Stored Procedure code i n  Password input 
box 
loginStoredProcUser Stored Procedure code in User input box. 
logi n  Success Log in w ith correct credent ials. Test for 
new page. 
log i nUnsuccess Login with wrong credentials . 
registerBlank Register w/o data. 
registerBlankDoB Register w/o Date of B irth . 
reg isterBlankPwd . Register w/o Passwords.  
reg isterBlankStud I D  Register w/o Student I D  
registerBlankSurname Register w/o Surname. 
reg isterBlankUser Register w/o Username. 
reg isterDuplicate Register duplicate details . 
registerlnval idDoB Register with a date of birth in wrong 
format .  
registerLongPwd Register with password > 20 characters 
registerLong User Reg ister with username > 20 characters. 
reg isterPage Test layout o f  Register page. 
registerShortPwd Reg ister with password < 6 characters. 
reg isterShortUser Register with username < 6 characters. 
registerSQLDoB SQL Injection code i n  Date of Birth input 
box&(' O R  1 = 1  --) . 
registerSQLPassword SOL Injection code in Password and 
Confirm Password input boxes . 
reg isterSQLStudentlD SQL Injection code in Student I D  input 
box .  
registerSQ LSurname SQL Injection code in Surname input box . 
reg isterSQ LUser SQL Injection code in User input box. 
reg isterStored ProcDoB Stored P rocedure code in Date of Birth 
input box . 
registerStoredP rocPwd Stored Procedure code in Password and 
Confirm Password input boxes . 
reg isterStored P rocStudent ID Sto red Procedure code in Student I D  i n put 
box .  
register Stored ProcSurname Stored Procedure code m Surname input 
box .  
registerStoredP rocUser 
resetPwd Blank 
resetPwd Long 
resetPwd Page 
Number. 
Stored Procedure code in User input box. 
Submit w/o Student ID I U CAS Serial 
Submit with Student ID&/ UCAS Serial 
Number&> 50 characters. 
Test layout of Reset Password page. 
resetPwdShort Submit with Student ID I UCAS Serial 
Number < 6 characters. 
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resetPwdSQL 
resetPwdS to red P roe 
'Browse To' Test 
BrowseToBin 
Browse ToConfiguration 
1 BrowseToCustoml inks 
Browse ToDocuments 
BrowseToEmai ls 
BrowseToForms 
BrowseToHTMLTemplates 
BrowseTol mages 
Browse Tolog in 
BrowseToM odules 
Browse T oN  avigation 
BrowseToPayment 
• Browse To T estArea 
SQL Injection code in Student I D  / UCAS 
Serial Number input box ( '  OR 1 = 1 --) . 
Stored Procedure code in Student I D  / 
. UCAS Serial Number input box . 
Browse to: 
http ://localhost/kinetic . kx .web.student.web 
site/bin/
http://localhost/kinetic. kx .  web .student .web 
site/Configuration/ 
: http://localhost/kinetic . kx .web.student.web 
· site/Customlinks/ 
http ://localhost/kinetic . kx .web.student.web 
site/Documents/ 
http :// localhost/kinetic. kx .  web . student.web 
site/Emails/ 
http://localhost/kinetic. kx .web.student.web 
site/Forms/ 
http: //localhost/k inetic. kx.web.student.web 
site/HTML Templates/ 
http://local host/kinetic . kx .web.student .web 
s ite/Images/ 
http://localhost/k inetic .kx.web .student.web 
site/Login/ 
http://localhost/kinetic . kx .web.student.web 
site/Modu les/ 
http://loca lhost/kinetic . kx.web . student.web 
site/Navigation/ 
http://localhost/kinetic. kx .web.student.web 
. site/Payment/ 
. http ://localhost/kinetic . kx .web.student.web 
site/T estArea/ 
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Appendix E 
List of ISO 27001  Items 
Setting Classification Standards 
Defining I nformation 
Classifying I nformation 
Accepting Ownership for Classified Information 
Labelling Classified I nformation 
Storing and Hand ling Classified I nformation 
Isolating Top Secret I nformation 
Managing Network Security 
3 .  CONTROLL ING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND SYSTEMS 
Manag ing Network Access Controls 
Controlling Access to Information and Systems 
Managing Access Control Standards 
Managing  User Access 
Secur ing Unattended Workstations 
Management Duties 
Th i rd Party Service Management 
1 .  I N FO RMATION SEC U RITY O RGAN IZATION 
Information Security Policy 
I nformation Secu rity policy 
Senior Management  Support 
I nformation Secu rity Policy Review 
I nter-departmental collaboration 
Information Security Organization 
Independent Review of I nformation Secu rity Policy 
Sharing I nformation with other Organizations 
2. CLASSIFY ING I N FORMATION AND DATA 
Controlling Access to Operating System Software 
Manag ing Passwords 
Securing Against Unauthorized Phys ical Access 
Access Contro l  F ramework 
Access Policy 
Restrict ing Access 
Monitoring System Access and Use 
G iving Access to Files and Documents 
Managing Higher R isk System Access 
I O I  
Controll ing Remote User Access 
Types of Access Granted to Third Parties 
Why access is granted to third parties 
Controlled pathway 
Node authentication 
Diagnostic and Configuration Port Controls 
Granting Access to Customers 
Acceptab le Usage of I nformation Assets 
Monitoring Third Party Services 
Third Party Serv ice C hanges 
4 .  PROC ESS ING I N FORMATION AND DOCUMENTS 
Networks 
Configu ring Networks 
Managing the Network 
Network Segregation 
Controlling Shared Networks 
Routing Controls 
Network Secu rity 
Accessing you r  Network Remotely
Defending you r  Network Information from Malicious Attack 
Time-out Facility 
Exploitation of Covert Channels 
Authentication of Network Connecting Equipment 
System Operations and Administration 
Appointing Syste·m Administrators 
Administrating Systems 
Controlling Data D istribution 
System Utilities 
System Use P rocedures 
I nternal Process ing Controls 
Permitting Th i rd Party Access 
Managing E lectronic Keys 
Managing System Operations and System Administration 
Managing System Documentation 
Synchronizing System C locks 
Monitoring E rror Logs
Schedu l ing Systems Operations 
Schedul ing Changes to Routine Systems Operat ions 
Monitorin g  Operationa l Aud it Logs 
Responding to System Faults 
Manag ing or Using Transaction I Processing Reports 
Commission ing Facilities Management - FM 
Third Party Service Delivery 
Log-on Procedures 
1 02 
Corrupt ion of Data 
Corrupt Data Controls 
Controlling On-Line Transactions 
E-mail and the Worldwide Web 
Downloading Files and Information from the Internet 
Electronic Business Communications 
Policy on Electron ic Business Communications 
Using and Receiving Digita l  Signatures 
Sending E lectronic Mail (E-ma ll) 
Receiving Electron ic Mail (E-mail) 
Retaining or Deleting Electronic Mail 
Developing a Web Site 
Receiving M isd irected Information by E-mail 
Forwarding E-mail 
Using Internet for Work Purposes 
Giving I nformation when Ordering Goods on Internet 
Setting up  Int ranet Access 
Setting up  Extranet Access 
Setting up  Internet Access 
'Out of the Box' Web Browser I ssues 
Using Internet 'Search Engines ' 
Maintaining your Web S ite 
Filtering Inappropriate Material from the I nternet 
Certa inty of F ile Origin 
Cryptographic Keys 
Key Management Procedures 
Controlling Mobile Code 
Telephones & Fax 
Making Conference Calls 
Record ing of Telephone Conversations 
Receiving Misdirected Information by Fax 
Giving Information when Ordering Goods on Telephone 
Persons Giving I nstructions over the Telephone 
Using Video Conferencing Facilities 
Persons Requesting Information over the Telephone 
Receiving U nsolicited Faxes 
Data Management 
Transferring and Exchanging Data 
Permitt ing Emergency Data Amendment 
Receiving Information on Disks 
Setting up a New Folder&/ Directory 
Amending D i rectory Structures 
Sharing Data on Project Management  Systems 
Archivi ng Documents 
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I n formation Retent ion Policy 
Setting up New Spreadsheets 
Setting up New Databases 
Link ing I nformation between Documents and Files 
Updating Draft Reports 
Deleting Draft Reports 
Using Version Control Systems 
Updating C ustomer Information 
Using Meaningful F ile Names 
Managing Data Storage 
Managing Databases 
Using Headers and Footers 
Using and Deleting 'Temp' Files 
Using C ustomer and Other Third Party Data Fi les 
Saving Data / Information by I nd iv idual Users 
Backup, Recovery and Archiving 
Restarting or Recovering you r  System 
Archiving I nformation 
Backing up Data on Portable Computers 
Managing Backup and Recovery Procedures 
Archiving Electronic F i les 
Recovery and Restoring of Data Files 
Document Handling 
Managing Hard Copy Printouts 
The Countersigning of Documents 
Checking Docume.nt Correctness 
Approving Documents 
Verifying Signatures 
Receiv ing U nsolicited Mail 
Style and P resentation of Reports 
Photocopying Confidential Information 
F iling of Documents and I nformation 
Transporting Sensitive Documents 
Shredding of U nwanted Hardcopy 
Using Good Document Management Practice 
Securing Data 
Using Encryption Techniques 
Sending Informat ion to Third Parties 
Maintain ing Customer I nformation Confidential ity 
Handling of Customer Credit Card Details 
F ire Risks to Your Information 
Sending Out Reports 
Sharing I nfo rmation 
Dealing with Sensitive Financia l  Information 
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Deleting Data Created&/ Owned by Others 
P rotecting Documents with Passwords 
Printing of Classified Documents 
Other Information Handling and Processing 
Using Dual Input Controls 
Loading Personal Screen Savers 
Speaking to the Media 
Speaking to Customers 
Need for Dual Control / Segregation of Duties 
Using Clear Desk Policy 
Misaddressing Communications to Third Parties 
Using External Disposal Firms 
Using Photocopier for  Personal Use 
Checking Customer Credit Limits 
5 .  PURCHAS I NG AN D MAINTAIN I NG COMMERCIAL  SOFTWARE 
Purchasing and Installing Software 
Specifying User Requi rements for Software 
Implementing New&/ Upgraded Software 
Selecting Business Software Packages 
Selecting  Office Software Packages 
Using Licensed Software 
Technical Vulnerabil ity Management 
Software Maintenance & Upgrade 
Applying ' Patches' to Software 
Respond ing to Vendor Recommended Upgrades to Software 
Interfacing Applications Software&/ Systems 
Supporting Application Software 
Operating System Software Upgrades 
Upg rad ing Software 
Support for Operating Systems 
Recording and Reporting Software Faults 
Other Software Issues 
Disposing of Software 
6. SEC U R ING HARDWARE ,  PER I PH ERALS AND OTH ER EQUI PM ENT 
Purchasing and Installing Hardware 
Specifying Information Security Requirements for New Hardware 
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Verifying Correctness of Information 
Travelling on Business 
Specifying Detailed Functional Needs for New Hardware 
Instal l ing New Hardware 
Test ing Systems and Equipment 
Cabling, UPS, Printers and Modems 
Supplying Continuous Power to C ritical Equ ipment 
Using Centralized, Networked or Stand-Alone Printers 
Managing and Maintaining Backup Power Generators 
Using Fax Machines / Fax Modems 
Using Modems I I SDN&/ DSL connections 
Installing and Maintaining Network Cabl ing 
Consumables 
Controlling IT Consumables 
Using Removable Storage Media including D iskettes and C Ds 
Working Off Premises or Using Outsourced Processing 
Contracting or Using Outsourced Processing 
Using Mobile Phones 
Using Business Centre Facilities 
Issuing Laptop / Portable Computers to Personnel 
Us ing Laptop / Portable Computers 
Working from Home or Other Off-Site Location (Tele-working) 
Moving Hardware from One Location to Another 
Day to Day Use of Laptop / Portable Computers 
Using Secure Storage 
Using Lockable Storage Cupboards 
Using Lockable Filing Cabinets 
Using Fire Protected Storage Cabinets 
Using a Safe 
Documenting Hardware 
Managing and Using Hardware Documentation 
Maintaining a Hardware Inventory or Register 
Other Hardware Issues 
Disposing of Obsolete Equipment 
Recording and Reporting Hardware Fau lts 
C lear Screen Policy
Logan and Legoff from your Computer 
Deal ing with Answering Mach ines / Voice Mail 
Taking Equipment off the P remises 
Mainta in i ng Hardware (On-site or Off-site Support) 
Using Speed D ial l ing Telephone Options 
Clean ing of Keyboards and Screens 
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Damage to Equipment 
Insuring Hardware 
Insuring Laptops&/ Portables for use domestically or abroad 
7 .  COM BATING CYBER CR IM E  
Combating Cyber Crime 
Defend ing Against Premeditated Cyber C rime Attacks 
Minimizing the Impact of Cyber Attacks 
Collecting Evidence for  Cyber Crime Prosecution 
Defending Against Premeditated Internal Attacks 
Defending Against O pportunistic Cyber C rime Attacks 
Safeguarding Against Malicious Denial of Service Attack 
Defending Against Hackers , Stealth-and Techno-Vandalism 
Hand ling Hoax Virus Warn ings 
Defending Against Virus Attacks 
Respond ing to Virus Incidents 
Collecting Evidence for Cyber C rime Prosecution 
Installing  Virus Scanning Software 
8 .  CONTROLLING E-COMMERCE INFORMATION SECUR ITY 
E-Commerce Issues 
Structu ring E-commerce Systems including Web S ites 
Securing E-commerce Networks 
Configu ring E-Commerce Web S ites 
Using External Service P roviders for E-Commerce 
9 .  D EVELOP ING AND MAINTAIN ING I N-HOUSE SOFTWARE 
Managing P rogram Source Libraries 
Establishing ownership for System Enhancements 
Justifying New System Development
Managing Change Control Procedures 
Making Emergency Amendments to Software 
Separat ing Systems Development and Operations 
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Contro!fing Software Code 
Manag ing Operational P rogram Libraries 
Controlling Software Code du ring Software Development 
Controlling P rog ram Listings 
Controlling P rogram Source Libraries 
Controll ing Old Versions of Programs 
Software Development 
Software Development 
Testing & Training 
Control l ing Test Environments 
Using L ive Data for Testing 
Testing Software before Transferring to a Live Environment 
Capacity P lann ing and Testing of New Systems 
Pa ral lel Runn ing 
Tra in ing i n  New Systems 
Documentation 
Documenting New and Enhanced Systems 
Other Software Development 
Acquiring Vendor Developed Software 
1 0. DEAL ING WITH PREMISES RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
Premises Security 
Preparing Premises to Site Computers 
Securing Physical Protection of Computer Premises 
Chal lenging Strangers on the Premises 
High Security Locations 
Delivery and loading areas 
Du ress Alarm 
Ensuring Su itable Environmental Conditions 
Physica l Access Control to Secure Areas 
Environmental and other external threats 
Data Stores 
Managing On-S ite Data Stores 
Managing Remote Data Stores 
Other Premises Issues 
Electronic Eavesd ropping 
Cabl ing Security 
Disaster Recovery Plan 
1 1 .  ADDRESSING PERSONNEL ISSUES  RELATING TO SECURITY 
Contractual Documentation 
Preparing Terms and Conditions of Employment 
Using Non Disclosure Agreements (Staff and Third Party) 
M isuse of Organ ization Stationery 
Lending Keys to Secure Areas to Others 
Lending Money to Work Col leagues 
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Complying with Information Secu rity Policy 
Establishing Ownership of Intel lectual P roperty R ights 
Employing / Contracting New Staff 
Contractin g  with External Suppliers&/ other Service P roviders 
Employees' Responsibi lity to Protect Confidentiality of Data 
Confidential Personnel Data 
Respecting P rivacy in the Workplace 
Handling Confidential Employee Information 
Giving References on Staff 
Checking Staff Security C learance 
Sharing Employee Information with Other Employees
Sharing Personal Salary I nformation 
Personnel Information Security Responsibilities 
Using the Internet in an Acceptable Way 
Keeping Passwords&/ P I N  Numbers Confidential 
Sharing Organization I n formation with Other Employees 
Signing fo r the Delivery of Goods 
S igning for Work done by Third Parties 
Ordering Goods and Services 
Verifying Financial C laims and I nvoices 
Approving and Authorization of Expenditure 
Respond ing  to Telephone Enquiries 
Sharing Confidential Information with Family Members 
Gossiping and Disclosing Information 
Spreading I n format ion through the Office 'Grape Vine' 
Using E-Mail and Postal Mai l Facilities for Personal Reasons 
Using Telephone Systems for Personal Reasons 
Using the Organization's Mobile Phones for Personal Use 
Using Organization C redit Cards 
Playing Games on Office Computers 
Using Office Computers for  Personal Use 
HR Management 
Dealing with D isaffected Staff 
Taking Official Notes of Employee Meetings 
Staff Leaving Employment 
Handling Staff Resignat ions 
Completin g  P rocedures for Terminating Staff or Contractors 
Obligations of Staff Transferring to Competitors 
HR Issues Other 
Recommending Professional Advisers 
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1 2 . DEL IVER ING TRAIN I NG AND STAFF AWARENESS 
Awareness 
Delivering Awareness Programmes to Permanent Staff 
Drafting Top Management Security Communications to Staff 
Third Party Contractor: Awareness Programmes 
Delivering Awareness Programmes to Temporary Staff 
Providing  Regular I nformation Updates to Staff 
Training 
I nformation Security Train ing on New Systems 
I nformation Security Officer: Train ing 
User: I nformation Security Train ing 
Technical Staff: I n formation Security Training 
Training  New Recru its in I nformat ion Security 
1 3 . COMPLY ING  WITH LEGAL AND POLICY REQU I REMENTS 
Complying with Legal Obligations 
Being Aware of Legal Obligations 
Complying with Copyright and Software Licensing Legislation 
Complying with the Data Protection Act or Equivalent 
Complying  with General Copyright Legislation 
Complying  with Database Copyright Legislation 
Legal Safeguards against Computer Misuse 
Complying with Policies 
Managing Media Storage and Record Retention 
Complying with I nformation Security Policy 
A voiding Litigation 
Safeguarding against L ibel and Slander 
Using Copyrighted I nformation from the I nternet 
Sending Copyrigh ted I nformation Electronically 
Using Text directly from Reports, Books or Documents 
Infringement of Copyright 
Other Legal Issues 
Recording Evidence of Incidents ( I nformation Security) 
Reviewing System Compliance Levels 
Renewing Domain Name Licenses - Web S ites 
Insuring Risks 
Record ing Telephone Conversations 
Admissib ility of Evidence 
Adequacy of Evidence 
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Collection of Evidence 
1 4 . DETECTING AND RESPONDI NG TO I S  I NC IDENTS 
Reporting Information Security Incidents 
Reporting Information Security I ncidents 
Reporting I S  I ncidents to Outs ide Authorities 
Reporting Information Security B reaches 
Software E rrors and Weaknesses 
Notifying Information Security Weaknesses 
Witnessing an Info rmation Security Breach 
Being Alert for Fraudulent Activities 
When and How to Notify Authorities 
Investigating Information Security Incidents 
Investigating the Cause and Impact of I S  Incidents 
Collecting Evidence of an Information Security B reach 
Recording Information Security Breaches 
Responding to Information Security Incidents 
Corrective Activity 
Establishing Remedies to Information Secu rity Breaches 
Other Information Security Incident Issues 
Ensu ring the Integrity of IS Incident  Investigations 
Analyzing IS  Incidents Result ing f rom System Failu res 
Monitoring Confidential ity of I nformation Security Incidents 
B reaching Confidentia lity 
Establ ishing D ual Control / Segregation of Duties 
Using Information Secu rity I ncident Check lists 
Detecting E lectronic Eavesdropping and Espionage Activities 
Risks in System Usage 
Reviewing System Usage 
1 5 . PLAN N ING FOR B USINESS CONTIN UITY 
Business Continuity Management 
Initiat ing the Business Continuity Project 
Assessing the Business Continuity Security R isk 
Developing the Business Continuity Plan 
Test i ng the Business Continu ity Plan 
Training and Staff Awareness on Business Continuity 
Maintaining and Updating the Business Continu ity P lan 
Realistic Testing Environment for B usiness Continu ity P lans 
Impact of the Pace of change on the B usiness Continuity Plan 
1 1 1  
